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Street Legal: The Court Affords Police
Constitutional Carte Blanche
WAYNE A. LOGAN"
I. INTRODUCTION
To the criminal defense bar, it seemed aFourth Amendment case nonpareil: a well-
off, white, middle-aged "soccer mom," with two kids in tow, and no contraband in
her possession, arrested and hauled off to jail for not wearing a seat belt. Alleging
that the arrest violated the amendment's ban on "unreasonable" seizures, the soccer
mom sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the arresting officer, his employer, the
City of Lago Vista, Texas, and the local police chief as defendants. In April 2001, the
Supreme Court held by a five-four margin in Atwater v. City ofLago Vista' that the
arrest was constitutionally reasonable, despite the fact that Texas law authorized, at
most, a $50 fine (and not jail or prison time) for failing to comply with the seat belt
law.2
In so deciding, the Court resolved a crucial question that it had dodged only three
Terms before, and which had evaded definitive answer for decades: whether police,
without a warrant, can make arrests for minor offenses not involving a "breach of the
peace."4 Justice Souter's majority opinion for the Atwater Court left no doubt about
*Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. I thank Professors David
Logan, Tracey Maclin, and Ron Wright for their helpful comments, and the William Mitchell
Faculty Research Fund for financial support.
1. 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001).
2. Id. at 1541 (citing TX. TRANS. CODE § 545.413(d) (Vernon 2000)).
3. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (avoiding judgment on constitutionality of
Iowa law permitting warrantless arrests for auto violations, instead invalidating search of
citizen incident to issuance of citation for speeding); see also Ricci v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 116 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding arrest for operating a business without a
license, a fine-only ordinance, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment),
cert. granted, 522 U.S. 1038, and cert. dismissed as improv granted, 523 U.S. 613 (1998).
4. SeeAtwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1561 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court has
never addressed "the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest for an offense punishable only by
a fine"); see also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463,471 (1985) (stating "[w]e leave to another
day the question whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits awarrantless arrest for [a] state law
misdemeanor"not involving abreach ofthe peace); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,266-67
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating "it seems to me that a persuasive claim might have
been made in this case that a custodial arrest . . . for a minor traffic offense violated
[petitioner's] rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. But no such claim has been
made"); Rouda v. United States, 10 F.2d 916, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1926) (Hand, J.) ("While a
peace officer might at common law arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed in
his presence, which was a breach of the peace, his power to do so in other cases is at best most
uncertain. Generally, it has been held not to exist.") (emphasis added).
Almost without exception commentators dating back many years have urged limits on such
authority, based both on its modest historical support and the troubling practical consequences
associated. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen & HarryShulman, Arrest With and Without a Warrant,
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police authority in this critically important area of street patrol, announcing the
bright-line rule that "[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual
has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender."5
Atwater's outcome, more than most five-four decisions, has a stark gut-level
resonance. Prior to the decision, if asked whether it is reasonable for an officer to
arrest a citizen for so menial an offense as failing to wear a seat belt while driving,
most Americans would respond resoundinglyinthe negative.6 However, itis accepted
learning that reasonableness assessments by the Court do not, and need not, always
align with the views of average Americans.7
Twenty-five years ago, the Court, on the basis of logic and far clearer Framing Era
75 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1927); Thomas R. Folk, The Case for Constitutional Constraints Upon
the Power to Make Full Custody Arrests, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 321 (1979); Wayne R. LaFave,
"Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma,
1974 SuP. CT. REV. 127; Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant ofthe Twentieth Century?
A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62
TEMP. L. REv. 221 (1989); William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the
Fourth Amendment, 58 Mo. L. REv. 771 (1993); Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant
(Part 1), 22 MICH. L. REv. 541,550 &n.54 (1924).
5. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1557 (emphasis added).
6. This sentiment was evidenced in the vigorous condemnation ofAtwater in the editorial
pages, including those found in some of the nation's most conservative newspapers. See, e.g.,
Commentary, FourthAmendment Through a Shredder, ORANGE COUNTYREG., Apr. 26,2001,
available at 2001 WL 9671289 (describing Atwater "as so outrageous as to defy logic and
reason ... [and an] assault on American liberties"); Bob R. Sanders, High Court Ruling Gives
Bad Cops a New Weapon, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 27,2001, available at 2001 WL
5148589 (stating that with Atwater "[b]ad cops... have been given another tool to use in their
abuse of power"); Editorial, Civil Rights Reduced, ROCKY MouNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 28, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 7371228 (stating that with Atwater the "Supreme Court has gravely
diluted one of our most important civil liberties"); Editorial, An Outrageous Decision, ARIz.
DAILY STAR, Apr. 26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 10339556 (calling Atwater "outrageous"
and "baffling"); Conmentary, Soccer Moms Beware, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26,2001, available
at 2001 WL 4151936 (calling Atwater "surprising and depressing," an "outrageous assault
upon basic civil liberties"); Editorial, A Third-Rate Opinion on Fourth Amendment,
TENNESSEAN, Apr. 27, 2001 (calling Atwater "outrageous" and asserting that the "Court has
just created one whopper of a tool for police harassment"); Editorial, Bad Precedent Ruling
Gives Police Too Much Leeway, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL
18521011 (expressing concern that Atwater "may make a rare and admittedly unfortunate
incident more common in the future"); An Erosion ofRights, SALT LAKETRmB., Apr. 30,2001,
available at 2001 WL 4635864 (calling Atwater "a travesty ofjustice").
7. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE L.J. 727 (1993) (concluding on the basis of
survey data that the Court's decisions significantly differ from those of citizens on what police
behaviors unreasonably infringe "privacy" or unreasonably "intrude" on citizens' physical
liberty).
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authority, endorsed police authority to execute warrantless arrests for felonies if
supported by probable cause." Atwater, on the basis of a far less convincing historical
record,9 reflexively transplanted this template beyond the realm of felonies. In so
doing, the Court in effect made probable cause a proxy for Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, rather than a necessary but not always sufficient constitutional
precondition.'0 And importantly, the Court did so with respect to a universe of laws
far greater in number and variety than felonies-for which police enforcement
discretion looms largest, given the comparatively less serious nature of the
violations.1
8. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,416-17 (1976). For an extended discussion
ofhow probable causeitself, as ajustification forwarrantless arrests, belatedly originated some
five decades after the time of firaming, see Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv, 547, 634-40 (1999) (noting that the standard was an "English
import" that first appeared in U.S. opinions in 1844 and 1850). According to Professor Davies,
"modem Supreme Court opinions and commentaries have obscured the post-framing expansion
of the officer's er officio authority by incorrectly asserting that probable cause was the
American 'common law' standard for arrest at the time of the framing." 14. at 639. This "myth
of a historical probable cause standard," Davies asserts,
is responsible for much ofthe confusion attending Fourth Amendment history.
We cannot appreciate the Framers' understanding ofthe problem of search and
seizure unless we remove the probable cause justification for arrests and
related post-framing developments from the picture. The Framers understood
that justifications for warrantless arrests and accompanying searches were
quite limited. Thus, they did not perceive the peace officer as possessing any
significant ex officio discretionary arrest or search authority.
Id. at 639-40 & n.252 (emphasis added).
9. See infra note 159.
10. Compare Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (concluding that mere existence of
probable cause that suspect committed a felony did not render reasonable police use of deadly
force), with Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that searches can be deemed
unreasonable even ifbacked by probable cause) and Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)
(holding that mere existence of probable cause that suspect committed traffic offense does not
justify warrantless arrest in suspect's home) and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765
(1969) (stating that reasonableness depends on "the facts and circumstances-the total
atmosphere of the case," and must be assessed "in the light of established Fourth Amendment
principles," not merely probable cause).
As Judge Garza noted in dissent from the Fifth Circuit's en bane decision in Atwater,
"probable cause [should] never immunize a constitutional violation." Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 195 F.3d 242,247 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Garza, J., dissenting); see also Gramenos
v. Jewel Co., 797 F.2d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[ilt is important to understand
that 'probable cause' is not always the same thing as 'reasonable' conduct by the police").
11. It also bears mention that, in refusing to exercise constitutional control over
warrantless misdemeanor arrests, the Court rendered citizens far more exposed to abuse without
redress. At common law, police, to the extent they could execute such arrests, did so at their
potential peril because the arrestee had to be proven guilty if the arrest was to be deemed
justified, with civil liability for trespass otherwise threatened. See Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest
2002]
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This Article addresses the numerous important ramifications of Atwater. Chief
among these, to be sure, is the practical effect of affordingpolice "constitutional carte
blanche"" to execute warrantless arrests, a right that carries the per se authority to
search. As will be discussed, this unfettered authority is extremely significant not
onlybecause it broadens the inherent power ofpolice to intrude upon citizens' liberty
and privacy, but also because it affords police even more discretion to selectively
enforce the law and to give effect to possible discriminatory motives. 3
Atwater's significance, however, extends well beyondboth the day-to-dayrealities
of street patrol and the acknowledged "pointless indignity" and "gratuitous
humiliations" experienced by Gail Atwater. 4 For one, while the decision underscores
the Court's troubling determination to remove itself from the constitutional oversight
of police, the vacuum created byAtwater affords states an opportunity to step in and
regulate police arrest practices, true to their role as "laboratories" of social
experimentation. However, as will be discussed, it remains unclear whether the
political will necessary for such a federalist evolution among the states will
materialize. Moreover, even should such limits on arrest authority be enacted, their
constitutional consequences remain uncertain because of the Court's ambiguous
treatment of state law in its search and seizure jurisprudence. Finally, despite the
seeming clarity of the bright-line rule embraced by the Atwater majority, the Article
outlines several of the maj or untoward consequences of the Court's decision to afford
police unfettered arrest authority relative to "very minor criminal offenses."
II. THE COURT'S DECISION IN ATWATER
Gail Atwater's travailbegan inMarch 1997 when, after retrieving her two children
(a boy and girl, ages three and five) from soccer practice, she slowly cruised her
neighborhood street in the small community of Lago Vista, Texas, in the hope of
finding a cherished toy that her son had dropped from the vehicle. 5 As the three
moved along at 15 MPH, craning their necks from the front seat of the family pickup
Without a Warrant (Part II), 22 MICH. L. REV. 673, 706 (1924). Moreover, at common law
citizens enjoyed broad license to resist arrests in excess of authority, unlike today. See Davies,
supra note 8, at 625. Indeed, warrants served to insulate officers from liability, providing a
strong practical incentive for their use. Id. at 626-27. Of course, redress today is permitted
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but this avenue is sharply limited by the doctrine of qualified
immunity in suits against individual officers. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct.
1536, 1565 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the availability ofrelief from state
and local governments pursuant to § 1983 is severely restricted. See Will v. Michigan Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989) (holding that states cannot be sued for monetary
damages for the operation of their arrest laws); see also Monell v. City of New York Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (concluding that a municipality can be sued only upon
proof of an unconstitutional policy or practice and not pursuant to respondeat superior theory).
12. See Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1563 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
13. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
14. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1553.
15. See Ross E. Milloy, Public Lives: For Seat-Belt Violator, a Jam, a Jail and Unmoved
Justices, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28,2001, at Al.
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truck in an effort to find the toy, police officer Barton Turek noticed that neither
Atwater nor her children were wearing seat belts, in violation of Texas statutory law.
After detaining Atwater at the side of the road, Turek told her "we've met before,"
referring to a prior incident when Turek mistakenly thought Atwater's son was not
wearing a seat belt; the officer then "yelled" that Atwater was "going to jail."16
Things then only got worse for Atwater. Turek first rejected her request that she
be allowed to take her children to the nearby home of a friend, despite the fact that
her children were "'frightened, upset, and crying,"' retorting that Atwater was "not
going anywhere."' Then, upon learning that Atwater lacked her driver's license and
insurance documentation because her purse had been stolen, a story he had "'heard
two-hundred times,"' Turek handcuffed Atwater and drove her to the police station
in his cruiser. Alerted by the commotion, a friend eventually arrived and prevented
the children from being taken away by Turek, as he had threatened. 9 Upon arriving
at the police station, Atwater was stripped of her personal possessions, subjected to
a "mug shot," and placed in a booking cell for approximately one hour before she was
brought before a magistrate and released on a $310 bond.2' Atwater eventually pled
no contest to the seat belt violation, and paid a $50 fine.'
After city officials rebuffed her request that police receive better training and
closer supervision, Atwater and her husband, an emergency room physician, sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the warrantless arrest for the fine-only seatbelt
violation constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.Y The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and a panel of the
Fifth Circuit reversed, only to later be reversed itself by the Circuit sitting en banc.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, agreeing to address whether "the Fourth
Amendment, eitherby incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests
or otherwise, limits police officers' authority to arrest without warrant for minor
criminal offenses."24
By a five-four margin, the Court affirmed, with Justices Souter and O'Connor
switching sides from their usual respective liberal and conservative orientations.
Justice Souter's opinion for the majority first examined early common law and
Framing Era authorities to assess police power to execute warrantless arrests for
16. See Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1541 & n.1.
17. Id. at 1541.
18. Id. at 1541-42. A subsequent inventory of Atwater's truck revealed two tricycles, a
bicycle, a cooler, a bag of charcoal, toys, groceries, and two pairs of children's shoes. See
Linda Greenhouse, Divided Justices Back Full Arrests on Minor Charges, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
25, 2001, at Al.
19. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1565 (O'Connor, ., dissenting).
20. Id. at 1542.
21. Id. Atwater's other charges, driving without a license and failing to provide proof of
insurance, were dismissed. Id. In addition to the fine, Atwater was forced to pay $110 to
retrieve her truck from the police impoundment lot. See Editorial, An Erosion ofRights, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Apr. 30, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4635864.
22. See Milloy, supra note 15, at Al.
23. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
24. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1542-43.
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offenses not involving a "breach of the peace." The upshot of this history, according
to the majority, is that "the common law commentators (as well as the sparsely
reported cases) reached divergent conclusions" on such police authority.'
Despite noting that "eminent authorities" supported the view that Framing Era
warrantless arrest authority was quite limited, the majority found the record
insufficient to support the conclusion that Atwater's arrest was contrary to the Fourth
Amendment. In particular, Justice Souter noted a 1631 English case upholding a
warrantless arrest for dice play, later cited by several eighteenth-century
commentators for the proposition that nonfelony arrest authority was not limited to
breaches of the peace.' Nor, for that matter, did early statutory enactments support
the view that officers were categorically barred from executing arrests for non-
breach-of-the-peace misdemeanors, in particular early English statutes permitting
warrantless arrests of persons roaming the streets at night ("nightwalkers").'
Justice Souter, moving to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, next evaluated
whether the warrantless arrest authority of officers was clarified by subsequent
authority or practice. If anything, he concluded, "the historical record as it has
unfolded since the framing" showed an increasing receptiveness to broad police
power to execute warrantless arrests fornon-breach-of-the-peace misdemeanors." In
support, Justice Souter quoted Michigan Law Professor Horace Wilgus, who had
observed in 1924 that the
states may, by statute, enlarge the common law right to arrest without
a warrant, and have quite generally done so or authorized
municipalities to do so, as for example, an officer maybe authorized
by statute or ordinance to arrest without a warrant for various
misdemeanors and violations of ordinances, other than breaches of the
peace, if committed in his presence."
This receptiveness, Justice Souter observed, continued largelyunabated in ensuing
decades to the point that today statutes in all American jurisdictions permit officers
some degree of authority to arrest for non-breach of the peace misdemeanors. 0 On
this basis, he concluded that this "simply is not a case in which the claimant can point
to 'a clear answer [that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the
traditions of our society ever since. '"'3
With the record inconclusive, the question thus became whether Turek's custodial
arrest of Atwater comported with "traditional standards of reasonableness," requiring
25.Id. at 1544 & n.2.
26. Id. at 1545-46 (citing Holyday v. Oxenbridge, 79 Eng. Rep. 805 (K.B. 163 1)).
27. Id. The Court also noted statutes from the eighteenth century and before that targeted
gamblers, peddlers, vagrants, and "negligent carriage drivers." Id. at 1547.
28. Id. at 1550-53.
29. Id. at 1551 (quoting Wilgus, supra note 4, at 550 & n.54).
30. Id. at 1553 & app.
31. Id. at 1552-53 (quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,60 (1991)
(alteration in original).
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the Court to "strike a current balance between individual and societal interests. 32 To
the majority, this balance weighed decidedly in favor of expanded police authority,
in keeping with the Court's penchant for bright-line rules regarding searches and
seizures,33 and in contrast to the case-specific analysis favored by predecessor
Courts.'" Accordingly, the majority rejected Atwater's suggestion that the
permissibilityofpolice arrest authorityturms onwhatit called "sensitive, case-by-case
determinations" dependent on (1) whether the underlying offense carried the threat
ofjail time, or (2) whether it was "'necessary for enforcement of the traffic laws or
... [constituted an] offense [that] would otherwise continue and pose a danger to
others on the road.""'3
To the majority, both prongs of Atwater's proposed test, while seeming to "respect
the values of clarity and simplicity,"'36 in reality threatened numerous problems. As
for the first prong-tying arrest decisions to the gravity of the suspected offense-the
majority concluded that it would unduly complicate police work because it would
require difficult on-the-scene judgments about whether jail time was legally
authorized:
It is not merely that we cannot expect every police officer to know the
details of frequently complex penalty schemes ... but that penalties for
ostensibly identical conduct can vary on account of facts difficult (if
not impossible) to know at the scene of arrest. Is this the first offense
or is the suspect a repeat offender? Is the weight of the marijuana a
gram above or a grambelow the fine-only line? Where conduct could
implicate more than one criminal prohibition, which one will the
district attorney ultimately decide to charge? 37
32. Id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999), and Veronia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995)).
33. In language echoing numerous other recent opinions of the Court endorsing similar
bright-line rules, Justice Souter characterized the need as follows:
Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and
in the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its command
of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be
applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months
and years after an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a
reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government's side
with an essential interest in readily administrable rules.
Id. at 1553-54.
34. See, e.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 255 (1960) (observing that "in most
cases involving a claimed unconstitutional search and seizure, reasonableness.., requires a
particularized evaluation of the officers involved"); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (stating that "there is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.").
35. Atwater, 121 S. Ct.'at 1555 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 46, Atwater, 121 S. Ct.
1536 (No. 99-1408)).
36. Id. at 1554.
37. Id. at 1554-55.
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The majority also dismissed the second prong of Atwater's proposed test, which
tied arrest authority to concern over scofflaw or otherwise dangerous offenders, again
out of administrability concerns. Citing speeding as one possible problem area,
Justice Souter asked: "[]s it not fair to expect that the chronic speeder will speed
again despite a citation in his pocket?" '38 Requiring police to divine whether behavior
would persist would put them in an "almost impossible spot," and, significantly,
"guarantee increased litigation over many of the arrests that would occur."39 In the
end, Justice Souter concluded that having the constitutionality of an arrest hinge on
such vicissitudes, would create among police a "systemic disincentive to arrest":
An officer not quite sure that the drugs weighed enough to warrantjail
time or not quite certain about a suspect's risk of flight would not
arrest, even though it could perfectly well turn out that, in fact, the
offense called for incarceration and the defendant was long gone on
the day of trial. Multiplied many times over, the costs to society of
such under enforcement could easily outweigh the costs to defendants
of being needlessly arrested and booked ... 
Finally, Justice Souter questioned whether in the end warrantless misdemeanor
arrests "need constitutional attention."'" For one thing, he reasoned, the Court's prior
decisions establish that all warrantless arrests must be reviewed by a magistrate
within forty-eight hours to ensure -that probable cause supports the detention.42
Constitutional protection is also afforded, on a case-by-case basis, to guard against
any arrest (whether felony or misdemeanor) that is "'conducted in an extraordinary
manner, unusually harmful to [the citizen's] privacy or even physical interests."' 43
Justice Souter noted that, beyond constitutional constraints, legislatures in several
jurisdictions have expresslylimited police authority to execute warrantless arrests for
minor offenses, an alternative he deemed preferable to a broad constitutional rule."
Such statutory limits themselves, Justice Souter inferred, were "natural" because it
is in the interest of law enforcement "to limit petty-offense arrests, which carry costs
38. Id. at 1555.
39. Id. Justice Souter elaborated:
It is no answer that the police routinely make judgments on grounds like
risk of immediate repetition; they surely do and should. But there is a
world of difference between making that judgment in choosing between
the discretionary leniency of a summons in place of a clearly lawful arrest,
and making the same judgment when the question is the lawfulness of the
warrantless arrest itself.
Id.
40. Id. at 1556.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55-58 (1991)).
43. Id. at 1557 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
44. Id. at 1556. Such an approach is preferable because "the statute can let the arrest
power turn on any sort of practical consideration without having to subsume it under a broader
principle." Id.
(Vol. 77:419
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that are simply too great to incur without good reason." 4
Justice Souter concluded by expressing confidence that the aforementioned
statutory controls---"combined with the good sense (and, failing that, the political
accountability) of most lawmakers and law-enforcement officials"-provided
sufficient protection to citizens.46 Indeed, such protections accounted for a "dearth
of horribles demanding redress," in the form of "foolish, warrantless misdemeanor
arrests."'4 While acknowledging that such arrests likely occurred on occasion, Justice
Souter expressed confidence that "surely the country is not confronting anything like
an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests." 4 Moreover, any concern that
police might utilize their expansive authority to arrest, in lieu of citation, and thereby
arbitrarily harass citizens, was "speculative" insofar as the record failed to indicate
that such a potential "has ever ripened into a reality."49
In sum, the Court rejected Atwater's claim that her warrantless arrest and detention
for a fine-only offense, as permitted by Texas statute,' violated the Fourth
Amendment. The upshot of Atwater is that if an officer has probable cause to believe
an individual "has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he
may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender."'" The sole limit
is that the act of physical arrest itself cannot be carried out in an "'extraordinary
manner, unusually harmful to [the citizen's] privacy or... physical interests."'52
Dissenting, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens,
criticized the majority for affording "constitutional carte blanche" to officers to arrest
for any offense, no matter how insignificant.53 Like the majority, Justice O'Connor
noted that the common law and historical record on misdemeanor warrantless arrest
authority was somewhat ambiguous, but emphasized that prior statements by
members of the Court gainsaid such authority.'5 More important, reasonableness
considerations militated in favor of banning the use of custodial arrest for fine-only
offenses. Rather than deferring to the institutional benefits of a bright-line rule in
evaluating reasonableness, Justice O'Connor was more concerned about the personal
and societal consequences of unlimited police authority. She catalogued the
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1557.
47. Id.
48.Id.
49. Id. at 1557 & n.25.
50. See Tx. CODE CRIM. Paoc. ANN., art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2000) (providing that a
"peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his
presence or within his view"); TEx. TRANSp. CODE ANN. § 543.001 (Vernon 2000) (providing
that a "peace officer may arrest without a warning a person found committing a violation").
51.Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1557.
52. Id. at 1557 (quoting Whren V. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
53. Id. at 1563 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1562 (stating that the "Court's thorough exegesis makes it abundantly clear that
warrantless misdemeanor arrests were not the subject of a clear and consistently applied rule
at common law").
55. Id. at 1561-62 (citing Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260,266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); United States v. Robinson,414 U.S. 218,238 n.2 (1973)(Powell, J., concurring)).
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consequences of custodial arrests, which include: a search of the body and
possessions of arrestees; 6 a search of the passenger compartment and any containers
therein, if the arrestee is driving a car;' detention in a holding facility for up to forty-
eight hours without judicial certification that the arrest was supported by probable
cause;58 the embarrassment and potential danger that attends detention; 9 and the
social stigma associated with having an arrest record.'
In order tojustifysuch a"severe intrusion on individual liberty," Justice O'Connor
reasoned that the governmental need must be substantial. However, in the context of
fine-only offenses, this need was sufficiently served by a less onerous
response-citations. Given the availability of citations, Justice O'Connor reasoned,
it betrayed reasonableness to endorse a bright-line rule that "deems a full custodial
arrest to be reasonable in every circumstance" solelybecause the officerhad probable
cause to believe that a violation occurred.6' Such an approach defied the Fourth
Amendment requirement that a police action be a "reasonable and proportional
response to the circumstances of the offense," instead giving police unfettered
discretion to execute custodial arrests "without articulating a single reason why such
action is appropriate." 2
In place of the majority's bright-line rule, Justice O'Connor advocated a case-by-
case constitutional analysis modeled on Terry v. Ohio: when an officer has probable
cause to believe that a fine-only offense has been committed, the officer "should issue
a citation unless the officer is 'able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
[additional] intrusion' of a full custodial arrest."6 To Justice O'Connor, such a rule
would be only modestly less clear and bright than that imposed by the majority, in
that it would merely require "a legitimate reason for the decision to escalate the
seizure into a full custodial arrest.. . ." Furthermore, whatever the option lacked in
categorical quality and administrability, it compensated for "in fidelity to the Fourth
Amendment's command of reasonableness and sensitivity to the competing values
protected by that Amendment." 5 As for the majority's concern over the "systematic
disincentives" associated with potential civil rights actions for false arrest, Justice
O'Connor observed that qualified immunity largely served to insulate against such
claims, and, at any rate, to the extent arrest disincentives arise, they did not free the
Court to "ignore the central [reasonableness] command of the Fourth Amendment
"66
56. Id. at 1563 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. 218).
57. Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)).
58. Id. (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991)).
59. Id. (citing Rosazza & Cook, Jail Intake: Managing a Critical Function-Part One:
Resources, 13 AM. JAiLS 35 (Mar./Apr. 1999)).
60. Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
61.Id.
62. Id. at 1566.
63. Id. at 1563-64 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) (alteration in original).
64. Id. at 1564.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1565.
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Applying her Terry-based test, Justice O'Connor concluded that neither "law nor
reason" supported Turek's decision to arrest Atwater.6 Atwater, a mother oftwo who
had lived in the area for sixteen years, whose only previous violation was ten years
before for failing to signal a lane change while driving, immediately accepted
responsiibility and apologized to Turek for her misbehavior."' It was thus likely that
she thereafter would have complied with the seat belt law, and be available for a court
appearance if necessary, making a citation a tenable and less restrictive option. Nor
did custodial arrest serve the interests of Atwater's young children as the City of
Lago Vista suggested on appeal. Turek's decision to arrest Atwater traumatized the
children, leaving them distraught and fearful of police.69 Instead of serving as a lesson
in legal responsibility, as would be achieved by a citation, the arrest "taught the
children an entirely different lesson: that 'the bad person could just as easily be the
policeman as it could be the most horrible person they could imagine."'7 0
Finally, Justice O'Connor turned her sights to the broader implications of the
majority's bright-line rule. O'Connor did not question the principal authority of
governments to enact public welfare-related laws punishable only by fine.7 Rather,
her concern lay with the enormous discretion enjoyed by police regarding such laws,
now augmented by the clear authority to arrest, and not merely ticket, citizens. With
such authority, she observed, comes "grave potential for abuse," particularlybecause
the Court's 1996 decision in Whren v. United States made the subjective motivations
ofpolice in detainingpersons irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes. To Justice
O'Connor, precisely because subjective motivations cannot now be considered, the
Courtmust "vigilantly ensure" that policebehaviors--"which are properly within our
purview-comport with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of reasonableness."
III. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF CARTE BLANCHE
A. The Practical Consequences
Despite the Court's insouciant view that there is no "epidemic of unnecessary
minor-offense arrests,"' 4 and "no evidence of widespread abuse,"' in reality
considerable evidence exists of widespread police resort to arrest for low-level
violations, and Atwater surely will do nothing to diminish the practice.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1565-66.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1566. Justice O'Connor added that Turek's actions were "disproportionate" to
Atwater's wrongdoing and that "[t]he majority's assessment that 'Atwater's claim to live free
of pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against
it specific to her case,' is quite correct. In my view, the Fourth Amendment inquiry ends there."
Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1567 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1557.
75. Id. at 1557 n.25.
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One source of evidence is the reported case law. To be sure, the fact that a police
behavior triggers little decisional law, as Justice O'Connor noted in her Atwater
dissent, constitutes an unreliable gauge of constitutional concern.7 6 This is because
constitutionally dubious practices can occur with some regularity yet not be
challenged by citizens for a variety of reasons, including the effort and expense
associated with constitutional litigation,' and the natural disincentive to pursue
claims when no long-term deprivation of physical liberty occurs." However, even
assuming that the Atwater majority is correct in suggesting that an abusive practice
must be "widespread" to warrant attention-itself a highly questionable
premise79 -the reality is 'that even the reported case law suggests a markedly
expansive use, and apparent abuse, of the misdemeanor arrest power.
The occurrence is most salient in decisions addressing motions to suppress
76. Id. at 1566 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. In this regard, Gail Atwater is a notable exception. Although at first reluctant to sue,
Atwater eventually filed suit to vindicate what she saw as the broader civil liberties
ramifications of her arrest by Turek. Atwater told one reporter, "[lf someone like me, a soccer
morn, can be humiliated and handcuffed in front of her children, what happens to the poor
migrant worker or minority when they're stopped?" Milloy, supra note 15, at Al. She also was
inspired by the memory of her father, a World War II veteran, and "just couldn't sit back"
while the civil liberties he fought for were "taken away." Id. To finance the case, Atwater and
her husband, a physician, sold their house and incurred legal costs in excess of $100,000. Id.
In the wake of the Court's holding, Atwater acknowledged that her lawsuit involved a "large
sacrifice," but added that "you don't live in a free society for free." Id.
78. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(noting that "invasion of personal liberty of the innocent too often finds no practical redress.
There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches ... of innocent
people which turn up nothing incriminating .... "); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 121 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Because we are called on to decide whether
evidence should be excluded only when a search has been 'successful,' it is easy to forget that
the standards we announce determine what government conduct is reasonable in searches and
seizures directed at persons who turn out to be innocent as well as those who are guilty. I
continue to believe that ungrudging application of the Fourth Amendment is indispensable to
preserving the liberties of a democratic society.").
79. Such a premise is analogous to saying that problems arising in the context of minor
offenses do not merit constitutional concern, a premise expressly rejected by the Court:
Many deep and abiding constitutional problems are encountered primarily at
a level of "low visibility" in the criminal process-in the context of
prosecutions for "minor" offenses which carry only short sentences. Wedo not
believe that the Constitution contemplates that people deprived of
constitutional rights at this level should be left utterly remediless ....
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,52-53 (1968).
Indeed, assuming the correctness of the majority's assertion that such arrests are "rare," it
could be argued that this empirical reality supports the Fourth Amendment unreasonableness
of the practice. Cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (citing paucity of affirmative jury
decisions to impose death on defendants convicted of rape as evidence supporting view that
the death penalty in such situations constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
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evidence seized in searches conducted incident to arrest, as permitted by the Court's
1973 decision in United States v. Robinson. Even courts prior to Atwater, for
instance, condoned warrantless arrests, and searches incident, for: illegal parking;8'
littering;82 riding a bicycle on a sidewalk" or without a headlight;" civil contempt
(based on a civil bench warrant);85 juvenile curfew violations;86 eating food on a
subway;8 7 truancy;8 s speeding; 9 driving with a broken taillight; possessing drug
paraphernalia;9 violating an alcohol open container law;92 public drinking;93 underage
possession of alcohol;94 "pedestrian interference";95 urinating in public;9- 6 and
possessing a suspended driver's license while operating a bicycle (on reasoning that
the document permitted misidentification). Subsequent to Atwater, courts already
have approved arrests, and hence searches, for walking in a roadway,98 driving with
an expired vehicle registration sticker," making an illegal turn while driving,"° and
violating a city ordinance for remaining in a public park after hours."'0 The Supreme
80.414 U.S. 218,236 (1973).
81. Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
82. United States v. Herring, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Or. 1999); State v. Sparks, 422
S.E.2d 293 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Ranson, 511 N.W.2d 97 (Neb. 1994); People v.
Whitted, 718 N.Y.S.2d 162 (City Ct. 2000).
83. United States v. McFadden, 238 F.3d 198 (2dCir. 2001) (interpretingNew York law).
84. United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Iowa law).
85. People v. Allibalogun, 727 N.E.2d 633 (111. 2000).
86. In re Charles C., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430 (Ct. App. 1999); In re J. M., 995 S.W.2d 838
(Tex. App. 1999).
87. Fisher v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982)
(interpreting D.C. law).
88. In re Humberto 0., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 248 (Ct. App. 2000); In re R. D., 749 So. 2d 802
(La. Ct. App. 1999).
89. United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Utah law); Kearse v.
State, 986 S.W.2d 423 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999).
90. State v. Hehman, 544 P.2d 1257 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
91. State v. Thompson, No. 23805-5-11,2001 WL 30058 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 12,2001).
92. Peoplev. Pantusco, 484N.Y.S.2d321 (App. Div. 1985); Statev. Pallone, 613 N.W.2d
568 (Wis. 2000).
93. State v. Thompson, 536 So. 2d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
94. Commonwealth v. Moscat, 731 N.E.2d 544 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000), rev. denied, 737
N.E.2d 467,547 (Mass. 2000).
95. State v. Greene, 983 P.2d 1190 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
96. Commonwealth v. Williams, 568 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); McConnell v.
State, No. 14-99-897-CR, 2001 WL 8344 (Tex. App. Jan. 4,2001).
97. Caraballo v. State, 753 So. 2d 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
98. Collins v. State, No. 14-00-00814-CR, 2001 LEXIS 3918 (Tex. App. June 14,2001).
99. Nicholson v. State, No. 05-00-01401-CR, 2001 WL 515919 (Tex. App. May 16,
2001).
100. People v. Fennell, No. B144396, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 1131 (Ct. App. Oct. 1,
2001).
101. Hudson v. State, No. CACROO-1013, 2001 WL 541069 (Ark. App. May23, 2001).
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Court itself, shortly after decidingAtwater, upheld an auto inventory conducted after
a warrantless arrest for speeding, driving without registration and insurance
documentation, and having an improperly tinted auto windshield, citing the case for
support.02
Another data source pertains to arrests alone. The most recent national data, from
1999, indicates that 2,300,100 arrests were executed for low-level offenses in
categories vaguely denominated "liquor," "drunkenness," "disorderly conduct,"
"vagrancy," "suspicion," "curfew and loitering law violations," and "runaways."' 3
The catch-all misdemeanor category "all other offenses (except traffic)" contains an
estimated 3,728,100 arrests. " In New York City alone, in 1998, there were 215,157
adult misdemeanor arrests, up sharply from 129,404 in 1993.'05 More recent data
from New York further underscores this trajectory: in 1999, there were 227,889
misdemeanor arrests, and 11,049 violation arrests; in 2000, there were 253,704
misdemeanor arrests, and 12,422 violation arrests."° Unfortunately, these statistics
do not indicate how many arrests were executed without warrants or involved non-
breach-of-the-peace offenses. 7 However, the empirical realitythat the overwhelming
proportion of arrests are in fact executed without warrants"0 8 provides a gauge of the
major numbers at issue, as do the descriptive categories. 9
The data, while impressive, become even more so when conceived in terms of the
102. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. 1876 (2001) (applying Arkansas law). Justices
O'Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens concurred, with Justice Ginsburg writing for her
colleagues. She acknowledged the Atwater majority's perception that there was a "'dearth of
horribles demanding redress"' and expressed "hope" that the majority would reconsider its
holding in Atwater if "experience demonstrates 'anything like an epidemic of unnecessary
minor-offense arrests."' Id. at 1878 (citing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536,
1557 (2001)). Cf Williams v. Jaglowski, 269 F.3d 778,784 (7th Cir. 2001) (citingAtwater for
support, upholding the warrantless arrest of suspended police officer for violation of police
internal rules).
103. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2000 tbl. 4.1 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001).
104. Id.
105. N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Selection for Criminal Justice Indicators,
available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/ areastat/areast.htm; see also Kevin
Flynn, Lower Morale, Yes. But Apathy? Police Say They Are Diligent as Ever, and the
Numbers Agree, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2000, at 25 (noting that arrests increased by 12% in
2000 over 1999).
106. Letter to author from Maureen Casey, Deputy Commissioner of Policy and Planning,
City of New York Police Department (dated August 23, 2001) (on file with Indiana Law
Journal).
107. For decades, no less than today, commentators have bemoaned the dearth of reliable
statistics on arrests, especially with regard to "low-visibility," minor offenses. See, e.g., Caleb
Foote, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in the Law ofArrest, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 16,20-21
(1957); Jerome Hall, The Law ofArrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U.
Cmn. L. REV. 345, 359-62 (1936).
108. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1999).
109. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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actual human consequences of arrest. Arrests, as noted by Justice O'Connor in her
dissent, subject individuals to the, risks of often dangerous and threatening jail
environments for up to forty-eight hours without judicial review. ° Arrestees suffer
separation fromwork and family, and are forced to endure the embarrassment and the
intrusiveness of being physically seized by a government agent."' And once the
custodial detention is over, the arrest persists, ignominiously, as a matter of public
record, 12 with long-term consequences.1  These consequences are not in the least
mitigated because of the minor nature of the underlying offense," nor by the
empirical reality, recognized for decades," 5 that most often misdemeanor arrests do
110. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1563 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also THE NAT'L SHERIFFS' ASS'N, JAIL CLASSIFICATION AND DIScIPLINE 34
(1988) (urging that booking officers be "acutely aware that being arrested or incarcerated,
especially for the first time, can be extremely traumatic for many persons").
111. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, ., concurring)
(describing arrest as "a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is
guilty or innocent"); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring) (stating that a "custodial arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into
the privacy of one's person"); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (describing
arrest as "a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, ... disrupt his
employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public
obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family, and his friends"); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (noting that arrest deprives persons of physical freedom, "the very
essence of constitutional liberty"); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1, cmt. at 290-91 (1975) (observing that "[b]eing arrested
and held by the police, even if for afew hours, is, for most persons, awesome and frightening").
112. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1563 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., 20 ILL COMP. STAT. 2630/3(A) (2000) (requiring preservation of arrest
histories and their dissemination to government officials as necessary); Deborah L. Rhode,
Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491,520-21 (1985) (noting that
applicants for professional licenses usually must acknowledge all arrests, regardless of their
ultimate disposition).
114. See, e.g., David Rohde, Police Arrest Smokers in Subways, and Lawyers Object,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at 48 (discussing police resort to arrests for menial offenses and
the many negative personal consequences to individuals). As Malcolm Feeley recognized
several decades ago, under such circumstances "the process itself is the punishment."
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT 199 (1979); see also Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 441
(7th Cir. 1986) (noting that most minor misdemeanor arrests do "not produce a sentence of
custody... so a custodial arrest itself becomes a substantial part of the penalty").
115. See Hall, supra note 107, at 359-62 (surveying data showing widespread resort to
arrest for minor crimes without ultimate prosecution). In 1927, Professors Bohlen and Shulman
observed that "[tlhe privilege to arrest without a warrant will undoubtedly lead to officers
taking into custody persons for offenses which, though actually committed and in the presence
of the officer, are subsequently deemed too insignificant to warrant prosecution." Bohlen &
Shulman, supra note 4, at 490.
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not result in actual prosecution." 6
By affording carte blanche to police, the Court thus subjected millions of
American motorists to the highly questionable discretion of police officers like
Barton Turek. 7 But one need not be driving a car to come within Atwater's reach:
if probable cause exists that even a "very minor criminal offense" was committed,
police can arrest." 8 This power, in turn, is amplified immeasurably by the Court's
prior decisions, in particular Robinson, which affords police the per se right to search
upon arrest,"9 and Whren, which allows police to use menial offenses as bases for
pretextual seizures, raisingthe additional specterofdiscriminatory applications ofthe
law. 2
0
116. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291,298 (1978) (stating "[a]n arrest... is a serious
matter for anyperson even when no prosecution follows or when an acquittal is obtained"). See
generally Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L.
REv. 1, 41, 49-58 (2000) (reviewing data indicating that fewer than half of all misdemeanor
arrests result in prosecution). In New York City, the flood of misdemeanor arrests has far
surpassed the adjudicative capacity of the local criminal courts, resulting in extremely high
dismissal rates. Ford Fessenden & David Rohde, Dismissed Before Reaching Court, Flawed
Arrests Rise in New York, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 1999, at Al. Cf Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 46 n.3 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting with respect to "stop-and-identify"
laws that localities, wishing to avoid challenges to such laws, might eschew prosecutions under
the laws and "use them merely as investigative tools to gather evidence of other crimes through
pretextual arrests and searches").
Professor Brady suggests that "low prosecution rates have become part of a criminal justice
'culture' in many of the largest jurisdictions, where better outcomes are not expected." Brady,
supra, at 43. The low prosecution rates themselves, Brady argues, cast significant doubt on
whether the government's action comports with Fourth Amendment reasonableness
requirements. Id. at 49-84.
117. Because of the broad array of potential violations associated with driving, and
complying with motor vehicle laws, motorists are easy targets for police stops, arrests, and
searches. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (recognizing that motorists are
subject to a"multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations"); see also LAWRENCE
TIFFANY ET Ai-, DETECTION OF CRIME 131 (1967) (quoting one officer as stating that "[y]ou
can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic violation if you tail him for a while, and then a
search can be made"); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" andAll Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 558
(1997) (noting that police officers "have a rule of thumb: the average driver cannot go three
blocks without violating some traffic regulation").
118. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct.1536, 1557 (2001) (emphasis added).
119. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
120. Whien v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Under Whren, any allegation of
selective enforcement would ostensibly find remedy in the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment. This is because "[s]ubjective intentions playno role in ordinary, probable-
cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id. at 813. Equal protection claims, however, face
notoriously formidable obstacles. See Harris,supra note 117, at 550-54; see also Brown v. City
of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769 (2d Cir. 2000) (denying equal protection claim brought by black
residents, in predominantly white town, based on police exclusively targeting blacks, resulting
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The Court's recent decision in Knowles v. Iowa, 2' requiring that police actually
arrest, not merely cite, a suspect in order to justify a search incident," provides
officers yet more incentive to arrest in the name of achieving broader investigatory
goals. 2  This incentive, it bears mention, is not diminished by the willingness of
states" ' and the Courte2 to downplay the aged common law requirement that a
in encounters with over two hundred ofthe three hundred blacks residing in town), cert. denied
122 S. Ct. 44 (2001).
121.525 U.S. 113 (1998).
122. Id. at 118-19.
123. This outcome is ironic given that the Iowa statute addressed by the Knowles Court
permitted police to search citizens that they cite but do not actually arrest, and was enacted as
part of broader law reform efforts designed to lessen the number of custodial arrests
experienced by citizens. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 10-2.1 to 10-2.3
(1968); AM. LAW INST., MODELCODE OFPRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.2, at 304-06
(1975). According to one commission of the era, "[e]very police agency [should] immediately
... make maximum effective use of State statutes permitting police agencies to issue written
summonses and citations in lieu of physical arrest or prearraignment confinement." NAT'L
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALs, THE POLICE 83 (1973).
124. See United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[t]he
potential benefits to be derived from a search of the person ... provide the police with the
incentive to employ the [search incident] exception as a potent investigatory tool").
This propensity has been recognized for years. See, e.g., ALLEN STEINBERG, THE
TRANSFORMATIONOFCRIMINALJUSTICE, PHILADELPHIA 1800-1880, at 180-81 (1989) (quoting
a local cityjudge, alarmed at increasing resort to arrests for minor offenses, who warned police
to discontinue their "constant habit of arresting parties in order to search them"). More
recently, Professor LaFave noted that the search incident to arrest power affords
an incentive to police to make custodial arrests for extremely minor crimes
whenever, because of a whim or suspicion, they would like to be able to
make a full search of a person or the passenger compartment of the vehicle
in which he was riding... [A] need exists for limits upon the power of the
police to resort to the custodial arrest alternative.
Wayne R. LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve
Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417,441 (1984).
125. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 784 n. 18 (noting that seven states have disavowed
the common law rule, deeming it to be ofnonconstitutional magnitude). See generally WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5. 1(b), (c)
(3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001) (discussing evolution of rule and various interpretations of
"presence").
126. The Atwater majority expressly avoided the question of whether the "presence"
requirement for misdemeanor arrests was of constitutional magnitude, seeing no need to
"speculate" on the question-presumably because Turekwitnessed Atwater's seatbelt violation.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1550 n. 11(2001). However, the majority
signaled its view that the requirement does not enjoy Fourth Amendment stature, citing a prior
dissent by Justice White. Id. at 1550 ("'[T]he requirement that a misdemeanor must have
occurred in the officer's presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not grounded in the Fourth
Amendment."') (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984) (White, J.,
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misdemeanor occur in an officer's "presence" in order to justify a warrantless arrest.
In short, as we enter the twenty-first century, American police enjoyunprecedented
power to arrest, and hence search, individuals for any and all violations. This power
has grown dramatically over the years, spurred by the growth of professional police
forces starting in the 1830s,2 7 and the perception that in an increasingly urbanized
nation more substantive criminal laws were needed," backed by increases in
warrantless authorityto enforce such laws." 9 As noted by Professor Barbara Salken:
Prior to the mid 1800s ... the summons was the rule ... Not until the advent
of the professional police force did arrest rules begin to change. Legislatures
dissenting)); see also Schmidt v. City of Lockport, 67 F. Supp. 2d 938, 942 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(noting that four U.S. Circuits have concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not incorporate
the common law presence requirement). Precisely why the Court felt itself at liberty to
disregard an accepted common law practice, but otherwise proclaim fealty to majority practice,
itself remains a troublesome question.
127. The City of Boston assembled the nation's first professional police force, in 1838.
See ROGERLANE, POLiCINGTHECITY: BOSTON 1822-1885, at 34-38 (1967). On the increasing
role of police in exerting social control, and their professional development in the increasingly
urbanized settings of America, see, for example, LAwRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27-30, 66-68 (1993); CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND
590-620 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922); Jerome Hall, Legal and Social
Aspects ofArrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARv. L. REV. 566,578-90 (1936); Carol S. Steiker,
Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 820, 830-38 (1994).
128. For discussion of the impact on police authority of the nation's increasing
urbanization, and on the substantive criminal law more generally, see Wayne A. Logan, The
Shadow CriminalLaw ofMunicipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001). See also PAUL
BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920 (1978); Eric H.
Monkkonen, A Disorderly People? Urban Order in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,
68 J. AM. L. HIST. 539 (1981).
129. Acting on this perceived need, numerous nineteenth-century cities invoked their
home rule authorityto adopt ordinances addressing new forms of social disorder and providing
broadened misdemeanor warrantless arrest authority to their police. See, e.g., Main v. McCarty,
15 II. 441 (Il1. 1854); White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St. 550 (Ohio 1860). The states also took
measures. Recognizing what it called the "necessities of metropolitan life," the Missouri
Supreme Court upheld a statute providing broadened arrest authority, stating that "[a]nyone
at all familiar with civil conditions in cities as contradistinguished from the country, realizes
that greater power should be given peace officers to preserve the peace and arrest offenders in
cities than is given to police officers elsewhere." Hanser v. Bieber, 197 S.W. 68, 70 (Mo.
1917); see also Hall, supra note 107, at 363 (noting that "[recent statutes] have brought within
the area of legal arrest, a vast number of misdemeanors which were not breaches of the peace
at common law, and hence not subject to arrest without warrant even though committed in the
presence of an officer"); Sam B. Warner, Modern Trends in the American Law ofArrest, 21
CAN. BARREv. 192,201-02 (1943) (discussing examples ofnew laws); Wilgus, supra note 11,
at 706 (stating "[i]t is impossible to ... enumerate the great number of... misdemeanors or
breaches of ordinances for which peace officers may arrest, without a warrant, if committed in
their presence").
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then adopted statutes granting sweeping arrest powers. Without considering
whether the taking of immediate custody was necessary, legislatures began to
authorize custodial arrests for minor crimes. This change appears to have been
aimed at making it easier to arrest without a warrant, but the effect was to
authorize custodial arrests for many offenses, such as ordinance and regulatory
violations, that had previously not been subject to arrest at all. 3°
The combined expansion of substantive law and arrest authority prompted Harvard
Law Professors Francis Bohlen and Harry Shulman in 1927 to write that the
development even then was of major concern:
The legislative mill turns out a steady addition to the list of misdemeanors.
These are oppressive enough if administered with the deliberation inherent in
the requirement of a warrant or summons. They become doubly intolerable if
every over-zealous peace officer, actuated by a lofty but inconvenient
crusading spirit, is permitted to take up, on sight, every person whom he
detects in the act of committing a misdemeanor.1
3
'
130. Salken, supra note 4, at 258-59; see also FLOYD FEENEY, THE PoLIC AND PRETRIAL
RELEASE 13 (1982) (noting that "[i]n the mid-1800s, as police departments were first being
formed and new minor crimes began to be created, the arrest rules for misdemeanors and minor
crimes began to change. Statutes and ordinances establishing the new minor crimes often
specifically authorized arrest without a warrant."). On the codification movement in the
mid-nineteenth century more generally, see KERMrr L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAw IN
AMERICANHISTORY 126-27 (1989).
This major augmentation in police power, in turn, was supplemented by the historically
novel, mid-nineteenth centuryjudicial notion that probable cause justified warrantless arrests,
as discussed supra note 8. As Professor Thomas Davies has noted, this shift
constituted a revolution in criminal justice authority and resulted in
warrantless felony arrests displacing the previous reliance on arrest warrants.
Additionally, the expansion of ex officio felony arrest authority expanded the
opportunity for officers to make warrantless searches incident to arrest,
making that power far more significant than it had been at framing.
In sum, the recognition of probable cause alone as a justification for a
warrantless arrest marked a drastic departure from the common-law regime
familiar to the Framers. The enlarged ex officio authority of the officer,
coupled with the organizational might of the new police departments,
fundamentally changed arrest and search practice. The modem police officer
and aggressive policing had become realities by the end of the nineteenth
century;, the warrant ceased to be the usual mode of arrest, and the
"ministerial" label disappeared fromthe literature on law enforcement officers.
Id. at 638, 639; see also id. at 741 (stating "[m]odern statutes and court rulings that confer
substantial er officio authority on police officers...providea level of discretionary authority
that the Framers would not have expected a warrantless officer could exercise unless general
warrants had been made legal").
131. Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 4, at 491.
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Courts in earlier times expressed grave misgivings about granting such blanket
warrantless authority to police, despite the existence of legislative imprimatur.'32
Subsequent decades, however, have evidenced an increasing receptiveness 33 to the
point that today, as noted inAtwater, all American jurisdictions afford such authority
to some degree."M WithAtwater, the movement has finally benefitted from clear-cut
constitutional endorsement, putting to rest the modem uncertainty regarding the
authority of police to execute warrantless arrests for minor offenses.' Both as a
result of and in tandem with such developments, policing strategies have shifted,
manifested today in aggressive "zero tolerance" and "quality of life" policing,
premised on the belief that minor offense arrests head off more serious but still
incipient criminal activity.'36 With such authority, unfortunately, comes the "power,"
132. See, e.g., In re Kellam, 41 P. 960, 961 (Kan. 1895) (invalidating statute affording
warrantless arrest authority for non-breaches of the peace, stating "[t]he liberties of the people
do not rest upon so uncertain and insecure a basis as the surmise or conjecture of an officer that
some petty offense has been committed"); Robison v. Haug, 37 N.W. 21, 25 (Mich. 1888)
(invalidating statute, reasoning that "[t]he manifest purpose of this statute is to bring certain
things that are not breaches of the peace within that denomination to avoid the necessity of a
warrant. But ... the constitution cannot be so evaded.").
133. See, e.g., Butolph v. Blust, 5 Lans. 84 (N.Y. 1871) (prohibiting such arrests),
superseded by N.Y. CiJM. CODE § 177 (1930) (permitting such arrests).
134. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1552 & app. (2001). Cf. AM.
LAwINST., CODEOFCRIMINALPROCEDURE232-33 (Official Draft, 1930) (noting that statutory
law at the time in 38 states authorized warrantless arrests regarding all misdemeanors).
Dicta in the Court's 1925 decision Carroll v. United States served as a major influence in
this evolution. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (stating without
qualification, in case involving an automobile search, that an officer "'may' arrest without a
warrant one guilty of a misdemeanor ... if committed in his presence"). According to
Professors Bohlen and Shulman,
[u]ntil the case of Carroll v. United States, the statements both ofjudicial
decisions and textbooks were substantially unanimous to the effect that
there was no privilege to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor other
than a breach of the peace, except in the case of a few misdemeanors such
as "night walking" and "riding armed."
Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 4, at 485. In addition, Carroll's precedential value as support
for broad arrest authority is undercut by the fact that such authority, to the extent it existed,
derived from the National Prohibition Act, not the common law. See id. at 489 (noting same).
For extended critical commentary on Carroll, and its subsequent misuse, see Davies, supra
note 8, at 731-34.
135. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Professors Bohlen and Shulman offered
in 1927 that "[a]t least let us be thankful that [Carroll] does not suggest a common law
privilege to arrest on sight for any public offense. This would include breaches of municipal
ordinances as well as statutory misdemeanors." Bohlen & Shulman, supra note 4, at 491. With
Atwater, this worst case scenario appears to have come to pass.
136. See generally George L. Kelling & Catherine M. Coles, FIXINGBROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIuME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996); Bernard E. Harcourt,
Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the
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as John Adams put it, "that places the liberty of every man in the hands of everypetty
officer;" 37 a power directly at odds with the acute distrust of discretionary authority
inherent in the Fourth Amendment itself'3 Of equal if not greater concern, such
unbounded discretion threatens that police will enforce the law discriminatorily, a
concern expressly downplayed by the Atwater majority,39 yet persistently evidenced
on America's streets with socially toxic effects." '
In this regard, the majority's approval of Gail Atwater's custodial arrest is in a
sense refreshing: she was, after all, a white, well-off female with no drugs or other
contraband in her possession, 4' not a Hispanic or African-American motorist or
Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV.
291 (1998); Phillip B. Heyman, The New Policing, 28 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 407 (2000); Debra
A. Livingston, PoliceDiscretion andthe Quality ofLife in Public Places: Courts, Communities
and the New Policing, 97 CoLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997). As Professors Kelling and Coles have
noted, these new strategies are by their "very nature more aggressive and interventionist than
traditional 911 policing." Kelling & Coles, supra, at 164 (emphasis in original).
The popularity of the approach persists despite its questionable efficacy in reducing crime
and disorder. See Harcourt, supra, at 312-39; Robert J. Sampson & Stephen J. Raudenbush,
Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods-Does it Lead to Crime? 2001 NAT'L INST. OF JUST. RES.
IN BRIEF 5 (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.opj.usdoj.gov/nij/rsrcdocs200 l.htm.
137. John Adams, Petition ofLechmere, in 2 LEGALPAPERS OFJOHNADAMS 106, 141-42
(L. Kinvin & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
138. See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searchingfor History, 63 U. CUI.
L. REV. 1707, 1729 (1996); see also Davies, supra note 8, at 591-600; Tracey Maclin, What
Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. OF CoNsT. L.
398,414-28 (2001).
To a significant degree, as Professor Davies has observed, this distrust was bred by "outright
disdain for the character and judgment of ordinary officers," who most often hailed from
uneducated and lower socioeconomic segments of the early American population, and were
poorly paid for their part-time work. Davies, supra note 8, at 577, 620-21. According to
Davies, "[t]he common-law tradition viewed any form of discretionary authority with
unease-but delegation ofdiscretionary authorityto ordinary, 'petty,' or'subordinate' officers
was anathema to framing era lawyers." Id. at 578. In contrast to officers, "the justice of the
peace was a man of wealth and high status in the local community." Id. at 623. See also David
F. Forte, Marbury's Travail: Federalist Politics and William Marbury's Appointment as
Justice ofthe Peace, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 349,354 (1996) (noting that the office was populated
by "men of means and standing" (quoting PETER C. HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL
AMERICA 3 (1992))).
139. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1557 n.25.
140. See, e.g., STEVEN K. SMITHETAL, U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, CRIMINALVICTIMIZATION
AND PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN 12 CITIES, 1998, 25-26 (1999) (citing statistics
underscoring continued negative perception of police in minority communities); BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS,
119 tbl. 2.29 (Ann L Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2001) (indicating that only 36% of
African-Americans polled believe that police in their community "treat all races fairly").
141. Turek's decision to arrest Atwater, rather than being driven by racial animus,
appeared to derive from emotional pique arising when she asked him to calm down and lower
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pedestrian, the typical targets of racial profiling and aggressive policing more
generally.142 The conclusion, moreover, is notable for its jurisprudential symmetry
with an outcome reached in another case litigated in the Fifth Circuit about the time
of Atwater's. In United States v. Castro, 43 the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc upheld not
only the Texas arrest of two Hispanic males for failing to wear seat belts, but also the
incidental search of their vehicle, which revealed a large amount of cocaine.'" The
officer elected to arrest, not ticket, the men for the seat belt violations because they
gave "conflicting statements" and had a "nervous demeanor."' 45
However refreshing, this symmetry will likely afford little solace to Americans of
all backgrounds who, in the years to come, will experience arrestmerelybecause they
are suspected of committing a minor offense. As a result of Atwater, we are all now
vulnerable to suffering "pointless indignities" and "gratuitous humiliations" at the
hands of vindictive officers like Turek. Even more ominous, Atwater frees up police,
when motivated by a discriminatory purpose,' 6 to arrest and search persons who do
his voice because he was scaring her young children. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1565 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
142. See generally ACLU, DRIViNG WHILE BLACK: RACIALPROFIUNG ON OUR NATION'S
HIGHWAYS (1999); CIviL RIGHTS BUREAu, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF
N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POUCE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP AND FRISK" PRACTICEs: A REPORT
TO THE PEOPLE OFNEW YORK (1999) [hereinafter STOP AND FRISK]; R. Richard Banks, Race-
Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1075 (2001); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333
(1998); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement By Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling
and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296 (2001); Anthony C.
Thompson,Stoppingthe Usual Suspects: Raceand the Fourth Amendment, 74N.Y.U. L. REv.
956 (1999).
143. United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 827 (1999),
144. Id. at 731.
145. Id. The Castro defendants, in fact, had been the target of an elaborate hunt by a drug
task force which trailed their vehicle for 115 miles through several counties. Id. at 730. A local
sheriff agreed to assist, but was told that "he would have to 'develop his own probable cause'
for stopping the vehicle." Id.
Dissenting, Judge Politz characterized the circumstances leading up to the seizure of the
defendants as follows:
This case presents the unique situation of an admittedly pretextual stop and
arrest, followed by a pretextual impoundment, to obtain a pretextual inventory
search for drugs the agents suspected were in the vehicle .... There must be a
point where the combination of pretext and continuing bad faith cannot be
tolerated if the fourth amendment protections are to have any meaning
whatsoever.
Id. at 734-35 (Politz, J., dissenting).
146. See supra note 120 and accompanying text; see also David A. Harris, Addressing
Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the "New Federalism" in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 376 (2001) (stating that after Whren
"[w]hatever else the Fourth Amendment does or used to do, it will no longer serve as a tool to
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not resemble Gaff Atwater-a far more likely scenario, yet equally lacking in
constitutional protection. 47
Unfortunately, with all constitutional control removed, there is little reason to
believe that officers themselves will exercise restraint, despite the Atwater majority's
confident inference that it is in the "interest of the police to limit petty-offense
arrests.', 48 This is because, in reality, for police the benefits of arrest far outweigh the
costs. To be sure, arrests entail significant burdens for police, in the form of time and
effort expended in paperwork and transport. Nevertheless, arrests-much more than
less intrusive seizures such as Terry stops, or consensual street encounters with
citizens-have enormous instrumental benefits. Most important, arrests for even
minor offenses facilitate police efforts to project an image of control and presence on
the streets 49 and enable them to intervene in what they perceive to be incipient
criminal situations."5 Even the threat of custodial arrest, reified byAtwater, can reap
benefits for police because citizens will be logically fearful of the associatednegative
consequences, making it more likely that they will submit to police intrusions
(including "consent" searches) in the hope of avoiding full custodial arrest.'
prevent racially based policing").
147. See supra note 120 and accompanying text; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies,
Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 457, 457, 462 (2000) (concluding on basis of New York data that "order-
maintenance policing" " is not about disorderly places, nor about improving the quality of life,
but about policing poor people in poor places"); James Walsh & Dan Browning, Presumed
Guilty Until Proved Innocent, STAR-TRIUNE (Minneapolis), July 23, 2000, at AI (noting
significantly higher warrantless arrest rates for African-Americans with regard to a broad array
of minor offenses).
148. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1556 (2001) (stating same and
asserting that such arrests "carry costs that are simply too great to incur without good reason").
149. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
146-49 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965) (observing on basis of field studies that police resort
to arrest to "maintain respect for the police"). This goal has motivated law enforcement since
the emergence of professional police forces in the mid-nineteenth century. As noted by
Professor Friedman, "the rise of the police was ... an event of huge significance. The police
interposed a constant, serious, full-time presence into the social spaces of the cities."
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 70 (1983).
150. See LAFAVE, supra note 149, at 437-82 (surveying widespread use of arrest to
control incipient social disorder). Reflecting on the landmark studies conducted by the
Amnerican Bar Foundation in the 1950s and 1960s, of which Professor LaFave's work was a
part, Professor Herman Goldstein recently observed: "The substantial police involvement in
an activity like traffic control, through arrests made and searches conducted, was used in
various ways to control serious crime." Herman Goldstein, Confronting the Complexity ofthe
Policing Function, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN
INDIvIDUAUazATION AND UNIFORMITY (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993).
151. See Amy Waldman, When a Badge Is Seen, Views Vary: After Louima, New Yorkers
Are Split on Police Progress, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2001, at BI (noting same). On consent
searches more generally, see Jose Felipe Anderson, Accountability Solutions in the Consent
Search and Seizure Wasteland, 79 NEB. L. REV. 711 (2000).
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Moreover, arrests, even for menial offenses, carry professional benefits for police
who feel pressure from commanders to "show results" in the current era of decreasing
crime rates."n Even more important, the per se authority to search upon any arrest'5 3
provides officers a compelling, volume-based incentive to execute custodial arrests
for minor offenses so that they can uncover evidence for "good busts" (that is, those
leading to more serious prosecutions). " And, if no evidence of more serious criminal
behavior is discovered, government can truncate extended systemic costs by
exercising its prerogative not to prosecute, a very common occurrence.
155
In short, the Atwater majority badly misconceived the motivational dynamic at
152. See Barry Loveday, Managing Crime: Police Use of Crime Data as an Indicator of
Effectiveness, 28 INT'LJ. SOC. L. 215,216 (2000) (observing that "[p]olice forces... are now
judged on performance criteria, which embraces their success in reducing crime"); see also
Howie Carr, Arresting Memo Puts State Cops in a Pinch, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 21, 1998,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Bherld File (discussing state police internal memorandum
demanding "corrective action... [to] increase the level of activity" because arrests are a "valid
indicator" of police performance); Larry Celona & Linda Masarella, "Collar" Shortage Puts
Queens Cops in Doghouse, N.Y. POST, June 11, 1998, at 12, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Nypost File (addressing internal memorandum from police supervisor threatening
officers with lost vacation days if they did not execute ample number of arrests); Thomas Ott,
Police Say Mentor Still Using Quotas, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 27, 1998, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Clevpd File (discussing use of arrest quotas). This pressure, it seems,
has been so substantial that it has encouraged fabrications of local crime data. See Fox
Butterfield, As Crime Falls, Pressure Rises to Alter Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1998, at Al
(reporting that "[s]enior police officials around the nation are concerned that the sharp drop
in crime in recent years has produced new pressure on police departments to show ever-
decreasing crime statistics and might be behind incidents in several cities in which [police]
have manipulated crime data").
153. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). Even more problematic,
as I have noted elsewhere, very often courts do not insist that a formal custodial arrest occur,
tojustiiy a search incident, concluding that it is sufficient if police "could have" arrested at the
time of the search. See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to
Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 381, 405-14 (2001). As a result, police
can search and yet avoid the logistical and administrative hassles associated with the arrest,
transport, and processing of suspects. Id. at 412-14. This power is extended further still by the
ongoing confusion among courts, and indeed legislatures, over the definitional parameters of
the legal concept "arrest." See id. at 418-38 (discussing numerous examples of same). In
Alabama, for instance, when police "arrest" a traffic offender, they "shall" issue a summons,
unless extenuating circumstances are present. See ALA. CODE ANN. § 32-1-4(a) (1975). This
of course poses a conflict in the wake of Knowles, which conditions search- incident authority
solely upon the occurrence of a custodial arrest. See Iowa v. Knowles, 525 U.S. 113, 118-19
(1998).
154. See Wayne A. Logan, Policing in an Intolerant Society, 35 CRIM. L. BULL 334,345
(1999) (noting that police have an "institutional, volume-oriented incentive to make 'bigger'
cases on the basis of custodial arrests and searches premised on petty crimes").
155. See supra note 116.
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work; instead of fretting about police "disincentives" to arrest for minor offenses, 56
the majority's focus should have been on providing citizens a countervailing buffer
against the potent incentives driving police resort to arrest. Such a buffer could
assume various forms, including Atwater's proposal that tied arrest authority to
whether the suspected offense carries jail time and whether government has a
compelling need for immediate detention,' Justice O'Connor's Terry-based
alternative, 5 ' or even an outright bar on warrantless arrests for nonfelony offenses
not involving a breach of the peace (however defined).'59 However, the majority
elected to afford police yet more discretionary authority to arrest, and search,
notwithstanding the ambiguous historical lineage supporting warrantless arrests for
minor offenses.' 6°
156. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1556 (2001).
157. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
159. The Atwater majority studiously avoided any attempt to define this category, which
has been the subject of disagreement for some time. See Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1543 n.2; see
also CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 61 (13th ed. 1989 & Supp.
2001) (citing and discussing cases reaching varied results).
160. Whatever else critical can be said of Atwater, the majority's treatment of the
historical record regarding warrantless misdemeanor arrests is troublesome. Even accepting that
enumerated exceptions existed at common law, like those authorizing arrests of "night
walkers," the fact remains that they were "exceptions" to accepted common law limits barring
officers from executing warrantless arrests for non-breach-of-the-peace misdemeanors. See
Davies, supra note 8, at 622 n.196 (citation omitted) (noting that as of 1794 there had been
only a "few instances" in Virginia in which officers had exercised warrantless arrest authority
for petty statutory crimes); see also Wilgus, supra note 11, at 704-05 (noting "a few
exceptional cases ofmisdemeanors"not involvingbreachesofthepeace thatjusifywarrantless
arrest). Cf. PERRYMLER, THE LIFE OFTE MiND IN AMERICA: FROM THEREVOLUTION TO THE
CIVILWAR 121 (1965) (referring to antebellum common law as "a haphazard accumulation of
precedents, quirks, and obscurities ... fundamentally irrational by its inherent nature").
Atwater's telescopic use of history, focusing on exceptions rather than rules, would appear a
distortion oforiginalist understanding, leading to a situation in which modem-day Americans
enjoy fewer protections than enjoyed by their forebears. See County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that Fourth
Amendment protections "should not become less than that" enjoyed at common law); see also
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment's goal was "to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons
and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision was adopted").
The majority's emphasis on the judicial and legislative augmentation of police arrest
authority over the course of many decades causes additional concern. See generally David A.
Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1794-99
(2000) (discussing "indeterminacy" of analytic efforts to gauge common law, based on
postfraning developments). Cf. Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a
Warrant, 49 HARv. L. REV. 566,575-76, 590 (1936) (noting that "[o]ne does usually think of
1827," the time when English courts first permitted warrantless arrests based on probable cause
for felonies and misdemeanors alike, "as tantamount to 'at common law"'). Rather than
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B. The Prospect of a Statutory "New Federalism"
Beyond Atwater's day-to-day practical importance, the decision is significant
because it underscores yet again the Court's determination to remove itself from its
structural role as arbiter and guardian of the Fourth Amendment.' 6' The mere fact that
Texas saw fit to legislatively authorize Atwater's arrest for a fine-only offense should
not have substituted for analysis of whether such an arrest was "reasonable." Echoing
Marbury,162 a majority of the Court noted over thirty years ago: "The question in this
Court upon review of a state-approved search or seizure 'is not whether the search
(or seizure) was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search [or
seizure] was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 1 63
While troublesome as a constitutional matter, this abdication might nonetheless
contain a silver lining: it can be taken as an invitation for the advent of a salutary,
statutory-based "new federalism."'' Under this view, in the constitutional vacuum
warranting deference in constitutional analysis, the ongoing enlargement of police authority
more aptly serves as testament to the unwillingness of courts over the years to exercise
constitutional oversight, at last culminating in Atwater.
Finally, given that the framing-era record convincingly shows that the statutes constituted
quite isolated exceptions to the common law rule limiting warrantless arrest authority, the
majority's insistencethat Atwaterhad a "heavy burden"to establish that officers' authoritywas
limited seems misplaced. See Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1553 n.14. If anything, the record
underscored the need of the majority to shoulder the burden of departing from mainstream
historical understanding and practice. Cf Sklansky, supra, at 1790 (noting that "the common
law revered by the Framers-the common law they thought timeless and universal-resided
in fundamental principles, not in judicial precedents and statutory prescriptions").
161. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (stating that "[i]t is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and to guard against
any stealthy encroachments thereon"). See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis M.
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19, 93-94 (1988)
(asserting that judicial oversight is necessary "to assure that the tradeoff between privacy and
law enforcement is [that which a hypothetical political system would strike if] everyone's
interests [were] counted equally").
162. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating
that "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is").
163. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968) (citation omitted); see also Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (asserting that "under the guise of
federalism the States should [not] be able to experiment with the protections afforded our
citizens through the Bill of Rights"). A similar sentiment was voiced more recently by
Michigan's supreme court, which observed that "it is not the genius of our system that the
constitutional rights of persons shall depend for their efficacy upon legislative benevolence.
Rather, the courts are charged with the solemn obligation of erecting around those rights, in
adjudicated cases, a barrier against legislative or executive invasion." Sitz v. Michigan Dep't
of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209,224 (Mich. 1993).
164. The phrase, if not the concept, originated most famously in a 1977 article by Justice
William Brennan, William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
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createdbyAtwater, "courageous" states canserve as "laboratories" ofcriminaljustice
experimentation,165 imposing limits onpolice authority in accord with local needs and
desires."6 This experimentation was already in evidence at the time of Atwater, with
several states imposing statutory limits on police authority to execute warrantless
arrests for specified minor offenses; 67 in others, "cite and release" provisions
permitted warrantless arrests for minor offenses but only under specific
circumstances (for example, when the suspect lacks identification or it appears that
the violation will continue).6 After Atwater, in addition to state courts imposing
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977), and a prior article by Professor Donald Wilkes, Donald
Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873 (1975). Since
its origin, new federalism has focused mainly on the rights-enhancing authority of state courts
to expansively interpret their own constitutions, not the enactment of legislative protections,
in the face of increasingly rights-restrictive decisions by the Supreme Court. See generally
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723 (1991) (discussing state courts' protection of fundamental rights
pursuant to their respective constitutions); Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of
Constitutional Law: How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1065
(1997) (same).
165. The reference, of course, dates from Justice Brandeiswho in 1932 urged that we "let
our minds be bold" in contemplating local legal experimentation:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state, may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing "social
experiments... in the insulated chambers afforded bythe several States"). For a discussion of
this view with respect to criminal justice issues in particular, see Kevin R. Wright, The
Desirability of Goal Conflict Within the Criminal Justice System, 9 CRM. JUST. 209, 213-14
(1981) (endorsing diversity because it permits inevitable conflicts in community values to be
fleshed out and resolved).
166. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963) (noting that under our federated
system, states are not "precluded from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches
and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law
enforcement"); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRuMNAL PROCEDURE § 1.2 (2000 ed.)
(exploring the capacity of states to implement their own criminal justice rules and processes).
167. See ALA.CODE § 32-1-4(a) (2001) (barringwarrantless arrests for traffic violations);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-240 1(d) (2000) (barring warrantless arrests for traffic violations and "a
cigarette or tobacco infraction"); OR. REV. STAT. § 810.410(3)(a) (2000) (barring arrests for
traffic violations). Indeed, Texas statutory law provides for two exceptions from the otherwise
broad authority to arrest: speeding offenses and open container violations. See TEX. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 543.004(a)(1) (Vernon 2000) (stating that officers can only issue written notices
to appear in such circumstances). In addition, numerous states expressly prohibit custodial
arrests for seat belt violations. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:295.1(G) (West 2001).
168. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.6(i) (West 2000) (suspect has outstanding warrants,
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reasonableness limits in accord with their own constitutions,'69 state legislatures can
seize the initiative to regulate police behaviors, creating, in the words of the Ohio
Supreme Court, "a substantive right of freedom from arrest for one accused of... a
minor misdemeanor."' 70 In short, Atwater's redeeming value, for civil libertarians at
least, is that legislatures now have a major opportunity to impose much-needed limits
on the discretionary authority of police in search and seizure decisions.1
7 1
Any optimism for progressive change in this arena, however, must be tempered by
lacks satisfactory identification, will likely continue unlawful act, refuses to sign citation, or
is not likely to appear); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401 (c)(2) (2000) (suspect otherwise will not
be apprehended, evidence will be irretrievably lost, suspect will harm self, others, or property,
or has intentionally inflicted harm on another); MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 6.0 1, subd. I (1)(a) (West
2001) (suspect will likely harm self or others, commit further criminal conduct, or not likely
appear); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-404.02 (Michie 2000) (suspect otherwise will not be
apprehended, might cause injury to persons or property, or destroy evidence); OmO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2935.36(A) (West 2001) (suspect requires medical care, fails to provide satisfactory
identification, refuses to sign citation, or has previously failed to appear); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-7-118(b), (c) (2000) (suspect likely to resume or continue offense, endanger himself or
others, or cannot produce satisfactory identification); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74(A)(1)(2)
(Michie 2001) (suspect will likely cause harm to self or others, will not likely appear, or fails
orrefuses to discontinue the unlawful act); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(c) (2000) (suspect fails to provide
satisfactory identification, will likely harm self or others, or is not likely to appear); WYo.
STAT. ANN. § 7-2-102(b)(iii) (Michie 2001) (suspect may cause injury to self, others, or
property; will not otherwise be apprehended; or evidence will be destroyed or concealed).
The District of Columbia has adopted a hybrid approach, designating certain offenses for
warrantless arrest, but only if the suspect will evade ultimate apprehension, might harm
himself, others, or property, or might tamper with or destroy evidence. See D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-581(2001).
169. See, e.g., State v. Bauer, 36 P.3d 892, 897 (Mont. 2001) (deeming it unreasonable
under Montana Constitution for police to arrest for non-jailable offense absent "special
circumstances").
170. State v. Slatter, 423 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ohio 1981). To add greater force to such
provisions, and to avoid uncertainty over their practical importance, states would be well
advised to codify provisions expressly requiring exclusion of evidence seized when such laws
are violated. See George E. Dix, NonconstitutionalExclusionaryRules in CriminalProcedure,
27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53, 66-74 (1989) (discussing legislative authority in this vein).
171. This recognized deficit dates back at least to United States v. Robinson and its
companion case Gustafson v. Florida. In Robinson, the defendant was arrested for operating
a vehicle without a license, and the officer was required to execute a custodial arrest, not
merely issue a ticket. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.2 (1973). In
Gustafson, on the other hand, state law afforded police discretion to either arrest or ticket
violators for driving without a license. See Gustafson v. Florida,414 U.S. 260,265 (1973). The
Gustafson Court, however, did "not find these differences determinative of the constitutional
issue," id., prompting Professor Anthony Amsterdam to remark that the Court passed up an
opportunity to make "the greatest contribution to the jurisprudence of the fourth amendment
since James Otis against the writs of assistance in 1791." Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MnN. L. REv. 349,416 (1974).
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the soberrealties of the political process. In words eerily reminiscent of a time before
Mapp v. Ohio" when the Court adhered to the view that states can be relied upon to
protect the civil liberties of citizens, 3 the Atwater majority expressed faith that, in
the absence of a constitutional limit imposed by the Court, abuses of unregulated
misdemeanor arrest authority would be limited by "the good sense" of police and,
"failing that, the political accountability of most local lawmakers." 74 As discussed
earlier, there is reason to be skeptical ofthe "good sense" of officers, given the strong
institutional incentives for arrest,'" incentives now no longer diluted by any residual
doubt over the constitutionality of warrantless minor offense arrests. 76
The Court's faith in "political accountability," however, is equally suspect, given
the acknowledged strong desire of politicians to be perceived as "tough on crime."'"
For examples one need only consider the proliferation of "three strikes" sentencing
provisions across the land,7 ' and the "exorbitant codes" of substantive criminal law
172. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
173. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949) (expressing faith that, in lieu of
extending the exclusionary rule to the states, "the internal discipline of the police, under the
eyes of an alert public opinion" sufficed to deter illegal searches). In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court
overruled Wolfand imposed the exclusionary rule upon the states, notwithstanding their
nonuniform fealty to the rule. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651, 659-60.
174. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001). Cf. Manson v.
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (expressing
confidence that the "rulemaking function" regarding police eyewitness identification practices
"can be performed 'more effectively by the legislative process than by a somewhat clumsy
judicial flat' and that "the Federal Constitution does not foreclose experimentation by the
States in the development of such rules"). But cf. Rodriguez v. Young, 906 F.2d 1153, 1162
(7th Cir. 1990) (noting continued failure of state and local authorities to regulate police
eyewitness identification procedures).
175. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (noting that prior to Atwater police
authority to execute warrantless arrests for minor offenses was unclear).
177. As noted by Justice O'Connor, herself a vigorous advocate of federalism and a
former Arizona state legislator, "[t]he legislature's objective in passing a law authorizing
unreasonable searches.., is explicitly to facilitate law enforcement .... Legislators by virtue
of their political role are more often subjected to political pressures that may threaten Fourth
Amendment values than are judicial officers." Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365-66 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Nor is the political influence of crime control advocacy limited to
state legislators; local politicians, too, are mindful of the political pull. See Herbert Jacob &
Robert L. Lineberry, Crime, Politics and the Cities, in CRIME IN CITY PoLrrIcs I (Anne Heinz
et al. eds., 1983) (recognizing that "[c]rime fighting is critical to the electoral fortunes of local
politicians"). For commentary on the political influence of crime control more generally, see
KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
(1997); Henry A. Chemoffet al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527 (1996).
178. See generally PUNISHMENT & DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN
CALIFORNIA (Franklin E. Zimring et al. eds. 2001); THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT:
VENGEANCE AS PUBLIC POLICY (David Shichor & Dale K. Sechrest eds., 1996) (discussing the
three strikes rule and the sources that influence its inception).
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that the Court has refused to regulate.179 Texas itself provides a stellar example of this
political predisposition. After the Court rendered its decision in Atwater, Texas
Governor Rick Perry vetoed a bill that prohibited warrantless arrests for minor traffic
offenses, except under specified circunstances."0 In announcing his decision
regarding the legislation, which was vigorously opposed by law enforcement groups,
the governor insisted that "[p]eace officers should retain their existing authority to
use their discretion to arrest for a traffic violation.' In the wake of the terrorist acts
of September 11, 2001, we can expect that the appeal of appearing tough on crime,
and granting deference to police authority, will be even more compelling to elected
officials. 182
Nor is there reason to think that leaders will be held politically accountable if it
becomes evident that police are abusing their warrantless arrest authority. The
Atwater majority presumed that constituents will complain to their representatives if
police abuse their authority, and that any excesses would in turn be curtailed by
legislative refinements." 3 In reality, however, if past experience is any guide, such
arrests will fall disproportionatelyon the politically disenpowered, individuals whose
voices are either muted or not heeded by elected officials." 4 Indeed, other than
179. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996):
[W]e are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what point
a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that
infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness
of enforcement. And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we
do not know by what standard (or what right) we would decide, as
petitioners would have us do, what particular provisions are sufficiently
important to merit enforcement.
Id. See generally Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law ofMunicipal Governance, 62
Oio ST. L.J. 1409, 1421-38 (2001) (surveying proliferation of such laws at the state and local
levels).
180. See Michele Deitch, Veto Risks Texans'CivilRights, DALLAS MORNINGNEws, July
1, 2001, at 5J, available at 2001 WL 24406662.
181. Tex. Mun. League, Governor's VetoesInclude Five City-RelatedBills (July 9,2001),
available at http://www.tml.org/legisupdate07090 I a_vetoes.htm.
182. The rapid enactment of the Patriot Act, with the overwhelming support of both
houses of Congress, is testament to this. See Robert E. Pierre, Wisconsin Senator Emerges as
a Maverick, WASH. POST, Oct. 27,2001, at A8 (noting that there was only one dissenting vote
in the Senate and sixty-six in the House in the votes to enact the legislation).
183. For other expressions of this faith, see, for example, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 n.16 (2000), avowing that "structural democratic constraints" will impede
excessive sentencing provisions. See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 228 (1977)
(expressing faith in the "political check on potentially harsh legislative action").
184. See generally Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the
Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the
Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1079 (1993) (stating that groups with little political clout are
the ones that suffer as a result of unrestricted law enforcement); Susan R. Klein, The
Discriminatory Application ofSubstantive DueProcess: A Tale of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL.
L. REv. 453, 488-89 (noting that the politically powerless may in reality be the ones bearing
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aberrations such as the arrest of Gail Atwater,"8 5 police are most likely not to arrest
those with political visibility;, their focus, rather, will be on those of lesser standing,
such as the Hispanic defendants arrested and searched in Castro.'
In short, it remains to be seen whether Atwater will provide the impetus for more
engaged legislative involvement in this critically important civil liberties area, or will
instead endure merely as an unfulfilled opportunity.
C. Whither "Fourth Amendment Federalism"?
Even presuming that states seize the initiative, a basic question still looms: what
influence would state laws, designed to constrain the warrantless misdemeanor arrest
authority of police, have on Fourth Amendment analysis? Suppose, for example,
police in a "cite and release" jurisdiction execute a custodial arrest in a given
situation, instead of merely issuing a citation as required by state law; or that they
execute a custodial arrest for a particular offense expressly made ineligible by
statutory limit; or indeed that they execute a warrantless arrest for a minor offense
committed outside their "presence," in violation of the common law rule codified in
numerous misdemeanor arrest statutes. Under state law, the arrests are demonstrably
illegal. But are they "unreasonable," and hence unconstitutional, for Fourth
Amendment purposes? And, if so, does this require that a reviewing court-a federal
one, in particular-suppress any contraband found by police in a search incident to
the arrest?
The Fourth Amendment significance of state arrest laws has been an abiding
source of confusion, dating back over fifty years to United States v. Di Re.87 In Di
the burden of unjust laws); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-CriminalLine,
7 J. CONTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 18 (1996) (asserting that individuals likely to be subject to
unfair criminal prosecution have little political power and are unable to influence the
legislature to change the laws).
A variation on this point surfaced in the oral arguments in Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113
(1998). There, in response to counsel's assertion at oral argument that undue or excessive
police searches of motorists who were merely issued tickets, but not arrested, would trigger a
legislative response, Justice Stevens retorted that Iowa police "might save [the strategy] for out-
of-state motorists." Oral Argument of Bridget A. Chambers on Behalf of the Respondent at 49,
Knowles, 525 U.S. 113 (No. 97-7597). See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Question Iowa Law
Allowing the Police to Search Cars in Traffic Violations, N.Y. TI7ms, Nov. 4, 1998, at Al 8.
185. Indeed, Atwater's determination, financial wherewithal, and initiative to retain a
lawyer and sue distinguish her from the unknowable multitude of persons who suffer what they
believe to be constitutional violations but do not seek redress. For Atwater, the ultimate
outcome was profound disillusionment with the system and substantial financial hardship. See
supra note 77.
186. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text. See also David Cole, Foreword:
Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice
Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059,1083 (1999) ("heproblem with discretionaryauthority-and
the need for judicial control is that discretion permits law enforcement to target those whose
complaints are least likely to be heard by the rest of the community.").
187. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
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Re, New York police violated state law in arresting the defendant without a warrant,
because they lacked requisite suspicion that he had committed a misdemeanor in their
presence, yet they obtained incriminating evidence in a search incident to arrest that
was later used in a federal misdemeanor prosecution. A seven-member majority of
the Court looked to the law of New York to determine the validity of the arrest-and
search-stating "that in the absence of an applicable federal statute the law of the
state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its validity.". 9 Noting
that no federal law applied, the Di Re majority invalidated both the arrest and search
and reversed the federal misdemeanor conviction for want of admissible evidence. 19
A similar deference to state law was evidenced in other decisions by the Court
down the years, including Johnson v. Unites States,9' Miller v. United States,'" Ker
v. California,93 United States v. Watson,94 and Michigan v. DeFillippo9 5 Perhaps
most notably, in Welsh v. Wisconsin96 the Court held that courts assessing the
reasonableness of warrantless in-home arrests based on exigency must take into
account the relative gravity of the offense involved, with such seriousness being
assessed in terms of how the offense is classified under state law (for example,
felony, misdemeanor, or some lesser violation).97
Other decisions by the Court, however, have suggested that state law is
constitutionally irrelevant. In Elkins v. United States,"8 for instance, the Court
concluded that for Fourth Amendment purposes "[t]he test is one of federal law,
neither enlarged by what one state court may have countenanced, nor diminished by
what another may have colorably suppressed."'" Even more recently, in California
188. Id. at 591,593.
189. Id. at 589; see also id. at 591 (stating that "the New York statute provides the
standard by which this arrest must stand or fall").
190. Id. at 594.
191. 333 U.S. 10, 15 n.5 (1948) (observing that "state law determines the validity of
arrests without warrant").
192. 357 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1958) (stating that "the lawfulness of the arrest without
warrant is to be determined by reference to state law").
193. 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963) (citations omitted) (stating "the lawfulness of arrests for
federal offenses is to be determined by reference to state law insofar as it is not violative of the
Federal Constitution. A fortiori, the lawfulness of... arrests by state officers for state offenses
is to be determined by [state] law."); see also id. at 31 (stating that the imposition of the federal
exclusionary rule "implied no total obliteration of state laws relating to arrests and searches in
favor of federal law" and did not sound a "death knell for our federalism").
194. 423 U.S. 411,420-21 n.8 (1976) (citation omitted) (noting "the rule recognized by
this Court that even in the absence of a federal statute granting or restricting the authority of
federal law enforcement officers, 'the law of the state where the arrest without warrant takes
place determines its validity"').
195.443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (stating that "[w]hether an officer is authorized to make an
arrest ordinarily depends, in the first instance, on state law").
196.466 U.S. 740 (1984).
197. Id. at 753-54.
198. 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960).
199. Id. at 206, 224.
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v. Greenwood," in determining whether the search of an individual's garbage can
was reasonable, the Court stated that "[w]e have never intimated, however, that
whether'or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
depends on the law of the particular state in which [it] occurs."" 1
As the Court itself has not spoken with one voice on this important question, so too
have the lower federal courts differed. The most pronounced conflict exists between
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. The chief Ninth Circuit precedent on the question is
UnitedStates v. Mota,2° 2 which involved the warrantless arrests bylocal police of two
street vendors for violating a city ordinance requiring that they have business
licenses, and their eventual federal prosecution based on counterfeit money
uncovered as a result of searches conducted incident to arrest. °3 The defendants
moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that California's "cite and release" law
required that they be issued citations, not arrested.2°
Emphasizing that the Court's decision in United States v. Robinson required a
"lawful custodial arrest" to authorize a warrantless search incident, the Mota court
deemed the arrests and searches unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.05
Because Californiahad "abjured the authority to execute custodial arrests" as to such
offenses, the prerequisite lawful authority for the arrests, and hence searches, was
absent.2' The Mota court concluded:
Given the state's expression of disinterest in allowing warrantless arrests for
mere infractions, we conclude that a custodial arrest for such an infraction is
unreasonable, and thus unlawful, under the Fourth Amendment. Since the
custodial arrest of appellants was invalid, the search should not have been
exempted from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment as a search
incident to a lawful arrest.207
The Mota court, however, was at pains to emphasize that state law is only
constitutionally significant in two particular contexts: searches incident to arrest and
inventory searches of vehicles. 8 Standing alone, reasonableness evaluations of
200.486 U.S. 35,43 (1988).
201. Id. at 35, 43.
202. 982 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1993).
203. Id. at 1385.
204. Id. at 1388-89.
205. Id. at 1389.
206. Id. at 1388.
207. Id. at 1389.
208. Id. at 1387. The court's inventory-based exception arose in United States v. Wanless
in which the court stated that 'federal law on inventory searches by state or local police
officers [requires] that they must be conducted in accordance with the official procedures of
the relevant state or local police department." 882 F.2d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis
in original). Recently, the Ninth Circuit summarized the rationale requiring judicial resort to
state law in addressing searches incident and inventories:
The common ground shared by these two exceptions is that the federal test
for the legality of an inventory search and a search incident to arrest
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wrongful police arrests challenged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, do not require
consideration of state law.2' Because the Mota defendants were arrested and
searched incident to arrest, however, and because the arrests themselves were illegal
under California law, Di Re required that the evidence obtained without warrants
incident thereto be suppressed.' 0
In United States v. Bell,2  the Eighth Circuit embraced a different view of the role
of state law. In Bell, two Des Moines, Iowa police officers arrested the defendant, a
known gang member with a history of drug offenses, for operating a bicycle without
a headlight in violation of state law.2 2 In a search incident to arrest police found
requires the incorporation of state law. For instance, an inventory search
is only lawful under federal law if it also conforms to state law. Therefore,
state law necessarily influences admissibility determinations, even in
federal court. By the same token, the legality of a search incident to arrest
by its very nature depends on the underlying legality of the arrest, a
consideration governed by state law.
United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); see also
LAFAvE, supra note 125, § 1.5(b), at 140 (noting that state law governs under such
circumstances "because it has, in effect, been 'incorporated' into the applicable Fourth
Amendment doctrine").
209. Mota, 982 F.2d at 1387 (citing Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770,772 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Concurring in the result, Judge Fernandez noted the asymmetry created: the government cannot
be sued under the civil rights laws for an arrest that is illegal under state law, yet if evidence
is secured pursuant to the arrest the officer can be sued and the evidence suppressed. Id. at
1389 (Fernandez, J., concurring). Judge Fernandez added that notwithstanding the possible
conflict, the majority's decision to bar the evidence seized incident to an illegal arrest was "a
shaft of cleansing light." Id.
In his treatise, Professor LaFave offers a game attempt to reconcile the apparent incongruity.
According to LaFave, the "Supreme Court has never taken the position that an arrest made on
probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment merely because the taking of custody was
deemed unnecessary(as a matter ofstate law or otherwise)." LAFAVE, supra note 125, § 1.5(b),
at 140. He suggests that the evidence in Mota was properly suppressed because it derived not
from an unconstitutional arrest, but rather from a search rendered unconstitutional because of
an illegal arrest. This is "because Robinson imposes a prerequisite of not just a constitutional
arrest but, more demandingly, a'lawful custodial arrest."' Id. Accordingly, the constitutionality
of an arrest, which is illegal under state law, is of no moment relative to any challenge under
§ 1983 claims against such an arrest. However, if the search is at issue, constitutional analysis
is at play because such a search is reasonable for Fourth 'Amendment purposes only if the
Robinson prerequisite ofa "lawful" arrest is satisfied. Id. & n.74. However, as discussed below,
Professor LaFave remains unsure whether the Robinson requirement of a lawful arrest depends
on the mere necessity of probable cause or also upon whether state law strictures on arrest are
satisfied. See infra notes 216-217 and accompanying text.
210. Mota, 982 F.2d at 1387, 1389; see also United States v. Velarde, 823 F. Supp. 792,
795 (D. Haw. 1993) (stating that for a search incident to be valid the "officer must have
authority to make the arrest. Authority to make the arrest is, in turn, a matter of state law.").
211. 54 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1995).
212. Id. at 503.
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cocaine, resulting in defendant's prosecution under federal law.213 Although the trial
court suppressed the evidence, reasoning that Iowa lawauthorized only a citation, not
an arrest for the bicycle violation, the Eighth Circuit deemed state law irrelevant
because "[a]n arrest by state officers is reasonable in the Fourth Amendment sense
if it is based on probable cause."2 "
More recently, the Eighth Circuit, applying Bell in United States v. Lewis,"'
upheld a search incident to arrest based on the violation ofa municipal open container
law that produced evidence for a federal drug prosecution, notwithstanding that the
arrest contravened Minnesota's "cite and release" law."6 Judges Heaney and
Goldberg concurred in the result on stare decisis grounds, but urged en banc
reevaluation of Bell, observing that the violation of state law undercut Robinson's
prerequisite of a "lawful" arrest.2P 7 For his part, Judge Heaney emphasized that he
thought it "incongruous to rely on common law as authority for an arrest based on a
statutory offense, particularly when the same statutory authority has already
constrained the power to arrest for that offense."2 "
Atwater, unfortunately, failed to clarify Vhat role, if any, state arrest law should
play in reasonableness evaluations. Turek's decision to arrest Atwater in fact did not
violate Texas's broad arrest authority statute. Moreover, Atwater merely challenged
her arrest for the seatbelt violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than seeking to
suppress evidence seized in a search incident to arrest, a species of claim in which
even Mota eschews consideration of state law.21 9
Atwater, however, strongly suggests endorsement of what Professor George Dix
has called "Fourth Amendment federalism,"" ° which regards state law as a
benchmark for evaluating the reasonableness ofpolice behavior. In Atwater, Turek's
authority to arrest, not merely cite, Atwater derived from express statutory
entitlement;z ' furthermore, the Court explicitly invited states to craft statutory limits
213. Id.
214. Id. at 504.
215. 183 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1163 (2000).
216. Id. at 794.
217. Id. at 794-95 (Heaney, J., concurring); see also id. at 795 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 795 (Heaney, J., concurring).
219. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text; see also Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d
368, 372 (4th Cir. 1974) (stating in a § 1983 case that "[t]he states are free to impose greater
restrictions on arrests, but their citizens do not thereby acquire a greater federal right").
220. George E. Dix, Fourth Amendment Federalism: The Potential Requirement ofState
Authorizationfor Law Enforcement Activity, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1986/1987).
221. See United States v. Sealed Juvenile 1, 255 F.3d 213, 216 (Sth Cir. 2001) (citing
Atwater and stating that "[a] law enforcement officer can make a warrantless arrest only if a
federal or state law imbues him with that authority"); see also Garrett v. City of Bossier City,
792 So. 2d 24,26 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing Atwater because arrest in that case was
"statutorily authorized," unlike the case at bar); West v. Commonwealth, 549 S.E.2d 605, 607
n.2 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishingAtwaterbecause "relevant Texas law expressly allowed
for the custodial arrest"); EDWARD C. FiSHER, LAWS OFARREST § 58, at 127 (1967) (observing
that "[m]odern authority of peace officers to arrest without a warrant is now governed by
statute in most of the states, and in these states such an arrest, except as thereby expressly
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on police authority, should they see fit, in lieu of the imposition of a broad
constitutional ban.' Viewed in this way, although troublesome in constitutional
terms for reasons already discussed, Atwater would be consistent with federalism
goals,' and would avoid the unseemly nullification of state laws designed to limit
police arrest authority.' Deference to state legislative limits would also be in keeping
with Di Re, which despite being criticized down the years, has never been
renounced by the Courtu5 and comports with precedent that ties reasonableness to the
existence of both probable cause and governmental authority to arrest. 7
However, like Bell, Atwater can be read to have made state law moot because the
constitutionality of the arrest arguably turned only on whether probable cause existed
that a law was violated, regardless of whether the arrest was explicitly authorized by
state law. Indeed, it remains unclear what the Robinson Court meant when it
authorized, is illegal"); Wilgus, supra note 11, at 703 (stating that "unless there is statutory
authority neither an officer nor a citizen may arrest for a misdemeanor which does not amount
to a breach of the peace even though it occurs in his presence").
222. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1556 (2001) (stating that "it is
of course easier to devise a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one through the
Constitution").
223. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (observing that "preventing
and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal
Government"). As Professor Dix has written, "[i]t cannot be reasonably disputed that as a
matter of general criminal justice system policy it is desirable to have state policymakers
address the extent to which various law enforcement techniques should be made available to
state law enforcement officers." Dix, supra note 220, at 45.
224. See Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937) (stating that "[t]here is no
principle of constitutional law which nullifies action taken by a legislature" and that "the
legislature... is presumed to know the needs of the people of the State").
225. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Exclusion ofEvidence in Federal Prosecutions on the
Basis of State Law, 22 GA. L. REV. 667,723 (1988) (callingDiRe "an ill-conceived decision"
that has "produced both confusion among the federal courts and illogical fragmentation in the
law governing searches and seizures").
226. But see United States v. Miller, 452 F.2d 731,733 (1 0th Cir. 197 1) (concluding that
Di Re was "rejected, by implication" in Elkins). The view has also been expressed that, rather
than amounting to a constitutional rule, Di Re instead was an outgrowth of the Court "utilizing
its supervisory power to exclude from a federal prosecution evidence obtained pursuant to an
illegal but constitutional ... arrest." LAFAVE, supra note 125, § 1.5(b) at 138.
227. According to the Seventh Circuit:
[he reasonableness of an arrest depends on the existence of two objective
factors. First, did the arresting officer have probable cause to believe that the
defendant had committed or was committing an offense. Second, was the
arresting officer authorized by state or municipal law to effect a custodial
arrestfor the particular offense.
Ricci v. Arlington Heights, 116 F.3d 288, 290 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added), cert. granted,
522 U.S. 1038, and cert. dismissed as improv. granted, 523 U.S. 613 (1998); see also Cupp
v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291,294 (1973) (looking to Oregon law for understanding of the term
"arrest").
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enunciated the requirement of a "lawful custodial arrest." According to the Court,
"[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification."' As Professor LaFave has noted, the
Court's language "seems to say that 'lawful' refers not to the limitations of state law
but rather to an overarching principle that all it takes to make a custodial arrest
reasonable in a Fourth Amendment sense is that it is based on probable cause."''
The ambiguous role of state law in Fourth Amendment analysis thus remains, as
before Atwater, in the words of Professor LaFave, a "particularly difficult
problem."' In the wake of Atwater, state courts have reached mixed results on the
Fourth Amendment significance of their indigenous statutory limits on police
warrantless arrest authority. 1 It remains to be seen how the federal courts will
resolve the issue, which given the burgeoning tendency of the federal government to
piggyback on the work of state law enforcement efforts, 2 represents a crucial
question that the Court itself doubtless will be forced to address in the years to come.
D. The Untoward Consequences and Ambiguity of Atwater's Bright-Line Rule
Another cause for concern derives fromAtwater's bright-line rule: that police can
arrest for any and all violations of law, so long as probable cause exists that the
violation occurred. 3 With its rule, the Atwater Court avoided imposing on police
"sensitive, case-by-case determinations," and seemingly advanced the cause of
greater consistency in search and seizure jurisprudence, long a concern of
228. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
229. LAFAVE, supra note 125, § 1.5(b), at 141-42.
230. Id. at 137.
231. Compare West v. Commonwealth, 549 S.E.2d 605, 607 (Va. Ct. App. 2001)
(granting motion to suppress cocaine based on officer's decision to arrest, not cite, because
cite-and-release requirements not satisfied), with People v. Patterson, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896,
899 (Ct. App. 2001) ("assuming" that California cite-and-release law was violated when police
arrested misdemeanant but affirming trial court rejection of motion to suppress, noting that
Atwater "profoundly limited Fourth Amendment restrictions").
For examples ofpre-Atwater decisions suppressing evidence seized incident to arrests for
petty offenses because local law expressly prohibited such arrests, see, for example, Barnett
v. United States, 525 A.2d 197, 199 (D.C. 1987) (invalidating arrest forjaywalking and barring
evidence) and State v. Jones, 727 N.E.2d 886, 895 (Ohio 2000) (same).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(discussing "Project Exile," in which local police review each firearm-related offense to
determine whether the conduct alleged constitutes a federal crime and, ifso, refer the defendant
to federal authorities). See generally Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and the Allocation
of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369 (2001) (discussing "Project
Exile," the policy implications of making it a nationwide program, and the consequences of
such federal intervention).
233. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001).
234. Id. at 1540.
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commentatorss and the Justices themselves.3 6 But consistency, as discussed next,
can come at a cost.
237
Perhaps most notably, the Court's blunderbuss bright-line rule risks
overinclusiveness. There is no disputing that there are instances in the daily work of
police in which factual determinations are quite difficult-for instance, as noted by
the Atwater majority, when the weight of drugs seized suffices to warrant jail time,
the suspect is a repeat offender, or the violation is likely to continue unless an arrest
is made. 38 However, the Court's scenarios, while perhaps useful in a hypothetical
sense, are of little practical significance because such precise line-drawing is
relatively rare in the course of police work. Far more common are situations such as
the one presented in Atwater itself, in which an officer uncovers what appears to be
a minor violation of law, and is faced with a clear-cut decision of whether to execute
a custodial arrest. Atwater's arrest itself starkly illustrates the excessiveness of the
Court's rule: she was a longtime resident of Lago Vista and had no criminal record
(indeed, the seat belt law embodied no aggravating provision for recidivists, as
hypothesized by the Court), she admitted her misbehavior, and she apologized once
Turek informed her of her violation.39 In short, rather than erring in favor of allowing
police to be "jerks,"2" the Court should have deferred to reasonableness
considerations militating in favor of protecting the physical and privacy interests of
citizens.24
235. See, e.g., AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES I (1997) (referring to Fourth Amendment case law as "complex and contradictory,"
a "vast jumble"); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models ofthe Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv.
1468, 1468 (1985) (describing law as "a mass of contradictions and obscurities that has
ensnared the 'Brethren"); Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603, 603 (1982) (stating that "it is difficult to avoid the
impression that the Court is no longer attempting to achieve doctrinal coherency in search and
seizure cases").
236. See, e.g., New Yorkv. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,664 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(criticizing the "hair-splitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence"); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 622 (1961) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(noting that "(flor some years now, the [Fourth Amendment] field has been muddy, but today
the Court makes it a quagmire").
237. As Professor Maclin recently noted, while bright-line rules have become a "staple
of the Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine," they very often appear the product ofresult-driven
analysis in favor of expanded police authority, rather than any "neutral principle for
determining when a bright-line rule should control a particular Fourth Amendment context."
Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE &L. REv. 117, 156-
57 (2001). For classic commentary on the role of bright-line rules in search and seizure
jurisprudence, see, for example, Albert W. Aschuler, Bright-line Fever and the Fourth
Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 227 (1984) and LaFave, supra note 4.
238. See Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1554-55.
239. Id. at 1565 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
240. Oral Argument, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001), available at
2000 WL 1801617 *21 (comment of Kennedy, J.).
241. The Atwater majority, however, erred in favor of police authority in such "tie
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Moreover, in embracing its "readily administrable" nule, 42 the Court did something
more than disserve citizens' liberty and privacy concerns.243 The Court also disserved
police and the high standard of police work rightfully expected in a democratic
society. Atwater suggests that police cannot, and should not be expected to, know the
law, a tenet contrary to both decisional law and common sense.2' Nor does Atwater
breaker" situations, reasoning that a liberty-deferential position would amount to an untenable
"least-restrictive-alternative limitation," and otherwise serve as a "systematic disincentive to
arrest" when arrest might best serve society's interests. Atwater, 121 S.Ct. at 1555-56. Such
an orientation, of course, is antithetical to the very animating purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, as expressed in numerous opinions. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895
(1975) (stating that "the central concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect liberty and
privacy from arbitrary and oppressive interference by government officials"); see also Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,304 (1921) (urging that the Fourth Amendment "should receive
a liberal construction" so that personal liberties will be preserved).
242.Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1554.
243. See id. at 1564 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (urging that the desire for clarity in rules
governing police conduct should not "trumpU the values of liberty and privacy").
244. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (noting that penalties
associated with a criminal act "can be easily identified both by the courts, and by officers faced
with a decision to arrest"); Doctorv. State, 596 So. 2d 442,447 (Fla. 1992) (stating that "[I]aw
enforcement officers are charged with knowledge ofthe law"). In keeping with this expectation,
courts have invalidated arrests and stops, and granted motions to suppress evidence seized as
a result, based on faulty police understandings of applicable law. See, e.g., United States v.
Sigmond-Ballesteros, 247 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2001) (suppressing evidence seized based on
motorist's quick lane change because behavior not illegal); United States v. Freeman, 209 F.3d
464 (6th Cir. 2000) (suppressing evidence seized as a result of a traffic stop based on a
motorist's brief deviation into a traffic emergency lane because behavior not illegal); United
States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1998) (suppressing evidence obtained as result of
traffic stop for failure to signal turn while driving because stop lacked "objectively grounded"
legal basis); Hilgeman v. State, 790 So. 2d 485, 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (suppressing
evidence based on arrest stemming from "officers' misapprehension of the law" pertaining to
violation of open container ordinance).
Nor does the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule redeem searches based on
arrests without basis in the law. See United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.
2000) (noting that "there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for police who do
not act in accordance with governing law"). According to the Lopez-Soto court, to provide an
exception "would remove the incentive for police to make certain they properly understand the
law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey." Id.; see also United States v. King, 244 F.3d
736,739 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (stating that "[e]ven a good faith mistake of law by
an officer cannot form the basis for reasonable suspicion, because 'there is no good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule for police who do not act in accordance with governing
law').
On the other hand, police are afforded latitude in the event they misapprehend facts related
to stops and arrests. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (stating that "what is
generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents
of the government... is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable");
2002]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
suggest that police should be expected to make reliable factual inferences, with their
corollary serious legal implications. This pronouncement is odd given that such
judgments permeate everyday police work, for example, in assessing probable
cause24" and reasonable suspicion,' 6 and even in the high-stakes decision of whether
deadly force is permissible .1 7 Indeed, state limits imposed on warrantless
misdemeanor arrest authority, discussed above, are premised on the faith that police
can (and should) make such factual determinations,248 a capacity, it bears mention,
increasingly enhanced by advances in technology that permit officers to more readily
assess the personal backgrounds of suspects. 9 Accordingly, ifanything, Atwater will
facilitate the "dumbing down" of police, as they will have no incentive to know the
statutory seriousness of an offense, and, in instances when they have unsubstantiated
hunches that a given suspect is perhaps more culpable in the eyes of the law (for
example, a recidivist), to be overinclusive and indulge such hunches at the expense
of citizens' civil liberties.
Ultimately, Atwater's rule might also militate against legislative initiative and
competence. As discussed, legislatures can now fill the vacuum created by Atwater
and impose limits on warrantless arrest authority, per offense type or category, or the
factual circumstances in which arrests can occur, as some states have already done.'
However, by disavowing any need to correlate reasonableness with offense gravity,
the Atwater majority missed an opportunity to provide legislatures with an incentive
to undertake critical reexaminations of their criminal codes, a task that is long
overdue."' WithAtwater's one-size-fits-all approach, legislatures across the landwill
continue to have no constitutional compulsion to reexamine the types of offenses that
should warrant criminal intervention;' any and all offenses, "even very minor" ones,
see also, United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding warrantless
search of vehicle that police reasonably but mistakenly believed was mobile).
245. See, e.g., Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411 (1976).
246. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221 (1985).
247. See Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
248. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Thomas J. Lueck, Patrol Officers Soon to Carry Minicomputers on Gun
Belts, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2001, atB6 (discussing recent purchase by New York City Police
Department ofminicomputers that provide foot patrol officers immediate access to information
on offense history and outstanding warrants).
250. See supra note 167-68 and accompanying text.
251. For an astute discussion of this need, see generally Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five
Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2000). Legislators, it
bears mention, are not alone in their failure to scrutinize and rethink the coverage of criminal
laws and their associated sanctions; scholars too have traditionally ignored the substantive
criminal law. See Markus D. Dubber, The Historical Analysis of Criminal Codes, 18 LAW &
HIST. REV. 433,433 (2000) (noting that "[s]tudents of Anglo-American criminal law, historians
included, have traditionally had very little to say about criminal codes").
252. See Markus D. Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea ofa Modern Model Penal Code,
4 BuFF. CGlM. L. REV. 53, 93 (2000) (asserting that "[i]n a modem democratic state, any law,
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now justify arrest for constitutional purposes. 3
In the wake of Atwater, jurisdictions can continue to indulge their tendency to
proliferate criminal laws without need for reflection.' Such laws, and their
enforcement, have manifold negative consequences for individuals, communities, and
society as a whole. 5 They also risk breeding disrespect for the law, with corollary
destabilizing effects?' As Professor TomTyler has written, "[i]fpeople feel unfairly
treated when they deal with legal authorities, they then view the authorities as less
legitimate and as a consequence obey the law less frequently in their everyday
lives." m
and particularly penal law, the most coercive mode of law, can only be legitimated through its
continuous scrutiny by its subject-objects, the constituents of the state").
253. Needless to say, police authority to arrest is intimately related to, and facilitated by,
the modem proclivity to overcriminalize. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 203 (1998) (noting that "[t]he tendency at the close of the twentieth century
is to focus not on the necessity that the guilty atone but on the pragmatic utility of using
criminal sanctions to influence social behavior"). This tendencyposes legitimacyproblems, for
as Professor Paul Robinson recently observed, "[a] central task of a criminal code is to impose
punishment on those who deserve the condemnation of criminal liability and to protect from
punishment and condemnation those who do not deserve it." Robinson et al., supra note 250,
at 14. Under this view, the criminalization of trivial offenses is "undesirable not only because
those activities themselves are minor or morally insignificant, but because their existence
subverts the moral and social power of the criminal code as a whole. However slight its effect
on the public, to criminalize the trivial is to trivialize the criminal." Id. at 15 n.28. For a classic
discussion of the deleterious effects of overcriminalization, see generally Sanford H. Kadish,
The Crisis ofOvercriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17 (1968).
254. See William .L Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REv. 842, 854 (2001) (emphasis in original) (noting that the
"[c]riminal law is not static; like other areas oflaw, it is constantly changing. Unlike other areas
of the law, it tends to change in one direction only: legislatures regularly add new crimes but
rarely repeal old ones").
255. See generally Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to Communities: Political,
Economic, andSocial Consequences, 65 FED. PROBATION3 (June 200 1); DinaR. Rose & Todd
R. Clear, Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications for Social Disorganization
Theory, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 441 (1998). For a discussion of the adverse impact of "over-
enforcement" on the African-American community in particular, see Dorothy E. Roberts,
Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 1005 (2001).
256. See Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law
and Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 989 (2000) (noting that "the key to the
effectiveness of legal authorities lies in creating and maintaining the public view that the
authorities are functioning fairly").
257. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 108 (1990); see also TOM R. TYLER ET
AL., SOCIALJUSTICEINA DIVERSFE SOCIETY 176 (1997) (asserting that "people who experience
procedural justice when they deal with authorities are more likely to view those authorities as
legitimate, to accept their decisions, and to obey social rules"); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law
Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 363 (2001)
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Beyond these practical concerns, Atwater's bright-line rule casts doubt on a realm
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that contains a proportionality requirement,
which correlates the reasonableness of police searches and seizures to offense
seriousness. 8 Perhaps most notable among these decisions is Welsh v. Wisconsin,259
in which the Court addressed the permissibility of a warrantless in-home arrest by
police of an individual suspected of committing a minor offense.
In Welsh, police received information from witnesses who reported that the
defendant had driven his car in an erratic manner, perhaps due to intoxication, had
run his car off the road, and had walked away from the accident scene.2 ° Shortly
thereafter, police arrived at the defendant's home, having learned his identity and
address from the car registration; once inside, despite the lack of a warrant, they
arrested him for driving while intoxicated."6 The defendant, who refused a
Breathalyzer test and had his license revoked as a result, challenged the
constitutionality of the warrantless, in-home arrest.62 The Welsh Court agreed:
Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless
arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying
offense for'which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor ....
When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, [the
presumption that warrantless in-home arrests are unreasonable] is difficult to
rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only
(concluding on the basis of survey data that the effectiveness of legal authorities such as police
"lies in their ability to gain acceptance for their decisions among members of the public");
Tyler, supra note 255, at 1001 (concluding that individuals "use their treatment by authorities
as information about their status in society .... Fair and respectful treatment acknowledges
people's importance and status, while unfair and disrespectful treatment communicates
marginality.').
258. As Justice Jackson noted over fifty years ago, "if we are to make ajudicial exception
to the Fourth Amendment... it seems to me that should depend somewhat upon the gravity
of the offense." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1567 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(urging that the Fourth Amendment requires "a reasonable and proportional response to the
circumstances of the offense"); Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (citation omitted) (stating
that "there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails"'); Sherry F. Colb,
The Qualitative Dimension ofFourth Amendment "'Reasonableness," 98 COLuM. L. REV. 1642,
1645 (1998) (asserting that "an 'unreasonable' search in violation of the Fourth Amendment
occurs whenever the intrusiveness of a search outweighs the gravity of the offense being
investigated"); Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron,
Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 39, 57 (1968-69) (arguingthat in criminal matters "there
is one case-by-case variable-the seriousness of the offense-which cannot be ignored by
police and courts").
259. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
260. Id. at 740.
261. Id. at 742-43.
262. Id. at 740.
[Vol. 77:419
STREETLEGAL
with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached
magistrate. 63
Writing for the six-member majority, Justice Brennan emphasized that "the gravity
of the underlying offense" is an important factor in gauging the reasonableness of
police action; when "only a minor offense" has been committed, a warrantless arrest
premised on exigency should rarely be sanctioned.2 "Gravity," in turn, is to be
gauged by how the offense is treated by the legislature: "[TJhe best indication of the
State's interest in precipitating an arrest, and... one that can be easily identified
both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest" is the penalty
prescribed.' Because drunk driving under Wisconsin law at the time was a
nonjailable civil offense involving a maximum $200 fine for first-time offenders, 2"
the Court proclaimed the arrest constitutionally unreasonable, deeming insufficient
the state's interest in foregoing a warrant for the "minor offense" arrest merely
because it feared that defendant's blood-alcohol level would dissipate.267 The Court
added that because classification of particular offenses can differ among states, "the
penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to provide the clearest and
most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of
committing that offense."268 Consistent with this analytic tactic, numerous courts have
attached importance to the "relatively minor" nature of the offense, invalidating
warrantless entries by police even when the suspected offense threatens actual jail
time." Others have expressly factored offense seriousness into their reasonableness
evaluations of police conduct beyond the context of exigent entries. °
263. Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 754 (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 746 (citing Ws. STAT. § 346.65(1) (1977)).
267. Id. at 753-54. Because the Court deemed the exigency-based need to arrest
insufficient under the facts, it stopped short of altogether banning warrantless, in-home arrests
for minor offenses. Id. at 749 n.I1 (stating that "[b]ecause we conclude that, in the
circumstances presented by this case, there were no exigent circumstances... we have no
occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose an absolute ban on
warrantless home arrests for certain minor offenses").
268. Id. at 754 n.14.
269. See, e.g., Howard v. Dickerson, 34 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1994) (invalidating arrest for
careless driving and leaving accident scene); Butler v. State, 829 S.W.2d 412 (Ark. 1992)
(invalidating arrest for disorderly conduct); State v. Curl, 869 P.2d 224 (Idaho 1993)
(invalidating arrest for marijuana possession); Edwards v. State, 808 P.2d 528 (Nev. 1991)
(invalidating arrest for indecent exposure); Fargo v. Lee, 580 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1998)
(invalidating arrest for underage drinking); State v. Kiper, 532 N.W.2d 698 (Wis. 1995)
(invalidating arrest for failure to pay fine for violating a municipal ordinance).
270. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (stating that allegations of
police excessive force should be analyzed in terms of reasonableness, which turns in part on
"the severity of the crime at issue"); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985)
(stating that "the fact that a multiple murderer is on the loose ... may affect the judgment of
what is reasonable .... Probable cause ... describes not a point but a zone, within which the
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Writing for himself and Justice Rehnquist in dissent,27' Justice White criticized the
majority for linking reasonableness analysis to offense gravity.272 To Justice White,
the "social, cultural, and political reasons" that drive legislative decisions to classify
an offense in a particular way should not be determinative of the constitutional
reasonableness ofpolice behaviors, for two practical reasons.'m First, "[a] warrantless
home entry to arrest is no more intrusive when the crime is 'minor' than when the
suspect is sought in connection with a serious felony."'274 Second, the coupling of
reasonableness with offense gravity threatened to "hamper law enforcement and
burden courts with pointless litigation concerning the nature and gradation of various
crimes. ' This was because the Court's approach would "necessitate a case-by-case
evaluation of the seriousness of particular crimes, a difficult task for which officers
and courts are poorly equipped."'276
If the Welsh dissent's bright-line approach sounds familiar, it should, because it
tracks the approach enunciatedby the five-membermajority in Atwater. The question
therefore arises: What remains of proportionality concerns in Fourth Amendment
analysis? In Illinois v. McArthur,2" decided the same term asAtwater, eight members
of the Court agreed that offense seriousness should be considered when assessing the
reasonableness of a police decision to prohibit a suspect from entering his home
while a search warrant was secured.278 The McArthur Court upheld the seizure by
distinguishing Welsh-police had probable cause to believe that McArthur committed
two jailable (yet minor) drug offenses, in contrast to the nonjailable offense in
graver the crime the more latitude the police must be allowed."); United States v. Holland, 510
F.2d 453,455 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting Arnold v. United States, 382 F.2d 4,7 (9th Cir. 1967)
(stating that the reasonableness of [an] on-the-scene detention is determined by all the
circumstances [including] [t]he seriousness ofthe offense"); People v. Scott, 578 P.2d 123,127
(Cal. 1978) (attaching importance to the "seriousness of the underlying criminal offense" in
evaluating reasonableness of bodily intrusion to obtain evidence); State v. Niblock, 631 P.2d
661, 666 (Kan. 1981) (stating that the "seriousness of the alleged offense" is a relevant factor
"in evaluating police conduct in making a warrantless arrest"). As Professor Silas Wasserstrom
has argued, once offense gravity is "introduced as an important factor in determining exigency,
it is hard to argue that it should not be relevant to other fourth amendment issues as well." Silas
J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 139-40 (1989).
271. Chief Justice Burger wrote separately, stating that he "would dismiss the writ as
having been improvidently granted and defer resolution of the question presented to a more
appropriate case." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 755 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Blackmun wrote
a brief concurring opinion, adding a "personal observation" that Wisconsin's decision to
impose a relatively modest sanction on first-time drunk drivers must be considered in the
analysis, but chastised the state's decision as "indulgent." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
272. Id. at 756-64 (White, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 760.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 761.
277. 121 S. Ct. 946 (2001).
278. See id. at 952.
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Welsh.279 This resulted despite the Court's almost contemporaneous refusal in
Atwater to factor into its reasonableness analysis the menial nature of the legal
violation triggering Atwater's arrest"'
If faced with the need, the Court might reconcile Atwater with McArthur and
Welsh insofar as the latter decisions concerned warrantless police activities regarding
279. Id. at 952. As in Welsh, the Court was loath to impose a blanket, classification-based
rule, electing instead to focus solely on the quantum of punishment imposed by the legislature.
See id. (noting that "[t]he same reasoning applies here, where class C misdemeanors include
such widely diverse offenses as drag racing, drinking alcohol in a railroad car or on a railroad
platform, bribery by a candidate for public office, and assault").
It bears mention that this aversion to use of offense classification is also evidenced in more
liberal results of the Court, such as Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), decided the
same term as Welsh. In Berkemer, Justice Marshall rejected use of a felony-misdemeanor
distinction for purposes of requiring police to Mirandize suspects, because police are "often
unaware when they arrest a person whether he may have committed a misdemeanor or a
felony." Id. at 430. Such ambiguity, Justice Marshall reasoned, would undercut the beneficial
bright-line clarity of Miranda:
Indeed, the nature of his offense may depend upon circumstances
unknowable to the police, such as whether the suspect has previously
committed a similar offense or has a criminal record of some other kind
.... It would be unreasonable to expect the police to make guesses as to the
nature of the criminal conduct at issue before deciding how they may
interrogate a suspect.
Equally important, the doctrinal complexities that would confront the
courts if we accepted [the classification distinction] would be Byzantine.
Difficult questions quickly spring to mind: For instance, investigations
into seemingly minor offenses sometimes escalate gradually into
investigations into more serious matters; at what point in the evolution of
an affair of this sort would the police be obliged to give Miranda warnings
to a suspect in custody? .... The litigation necessary to resolve such
matters would be time-consuming and disruptive oflaw enforcement. And
the end result would be an elaborate set of rules, interlaced with
exceptions and subtle distinctions, discriminating between different kinds
of custodial interrogations. Neither the police nor criminal defendants
would benefit from such a development.
Id. at 430-32.
While Marshall's reasoning appears to be at odds with his normal pro-civil liberties
orientation, it can be reconciled, and indeed gains more analytic force, when one reflects upon
the question before the Court: Should the judiciary err on the side of overinclusion when
requiring police to provide Miranda warnings, designed to serve a "prophylactic"
constitutional purpose? The Berkemer Court responded unanimously in the affirmative. In
Atwater, on the other hand, the question was whether overinclusiveness should be risked with
respect to arrests, which infringe liberties, and thus should logically warrant a different
emphasis.
280. See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
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the home, a place typically28" ' (but not always)' accorded paramount Fourth
Amendment protection. However, the parallels between Atwater and Welsh in
particular are striking: both involved warrantless arrests for fine-only offenses.
Indeed, the arrest condemned in Welsh involved a more serious offense thanAtwater,
yet the arrest in Welsh alone was deemed unreasonable. How the Court will resolve
this conflict bears not just on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence but also possibly on
other constitutional realms in which proportionality analysis currently applies, like
the Sixth Amendment rights to jury trial,u 3 counsel,2" and speedy trial," 5 and may
even raise due process concerns.28
IV. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the Court's decision in Atwater to permit warrantless arrests
281. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 (stating "[t]he Supreme Court of Wisconsin let stand a
warrantless, nighttime entry into the petitioner's home to arrest him for a civil traffic offense.
Such an arrest, however, is clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual
in his home by the Fourth Amendment."). As the Court noted at the outset of its opinion, "[i]t
is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed."' Id. at 748 (quoting United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); see also Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041
(2001) (citation omitted) (stating "'[a]t the very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971) (stating it is a "basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches... inside a man's house without warrant are
per se unreasonable").
282. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (noting
that "the invasion and disruption of a man's life and privacy which stem from his arrest are
ordinarily far greater than the relatively minor intrusions attending a search of his premises');
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,8-9 (1968) (stating that "[t]his inestimable right of personal security
belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner").
283. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (holding that persons accused of
"petty offenses" are not entitled to jury trials, and defining "petty" as offenses involving six or
less months of incarceration). Almost twenty years after Baldwin, the Court elaborated that, in
assessing whether an offense is "petty," it has looked to "'objective indications of the
seriousness with which society regards the offense.' '[W]e have found the most relevant such
criteria [sic] is the severity of the maximum authorized penalty." Blanton v. North Las Vegas,
489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989) (citations omitted).
284. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that indigent suspects are not
entitled to appointed counsel unless the conviction results in "actual imprisonment").
285. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (adopting a four-part test,
including offense seriousness, in analyzing speedy trial claims regarding delays stemming from
interlocutory appellate review).
286. See, e.g., United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (weighing gravity
of the offense charged in assessing the due process rights of a criminal suspect to avoid being
involuntarily subjected to psychotropic medication for purposes of being rendered competent
to stand trial).
[Vol. 77:419
STREETLEGAL
for "even very minor criminal offenses" will likely number among its most important
Fourth Amendment decisions since Terry v. Ohio.' This significance stems both
from the sheer practical consequences associated with formally granting police
unlimited authority to arrest for the myriad minor offenses now punishable by law,
and from what the decision potentially signals in other areas of search and seizure
law.
As for the former, there can be no understating the practical effect of Atwater. For
the first time in its over two-hundred-year history, the Court has made clear that it is
constitutionally reasonable for police, without warrants, to arrest citizens for minor
violations of the law (even those that do not threaten jail time). That the Court was
not sensitive to the personal consequences of"being needlessly arrested and booked,"
and subjected to "pointless indignity" and "gratuitous humiliations,""28 should give
pause to all Americans, who, in contrast to members of the Atwater majority,
themselves unlikely targets ofaggressivepolicing, will suffer the brunt of the Court's
cavalier sentiment. But the consequences do not stop with the immediate personal
consequences of arrest-with arrest comes the power to search, ratchetting up
considerably the intrusiveness of police-citizen encounters.2 9
In announcing its bright-line rule-that any and all legal violations can justify
warrantless custodial arrest-the Court underscored its determination to withdraw
from its oversight of the daily work of police. This abdication is troubling enough as
a matter of constitutional principle. Conceived in the broader context of street patrol,
however, the abdication is downright ominous, because Whren v. United States
deemed officers' motivations constitutionally irrelevant in search and seizure
decisions.
287. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court for the first time condoned "investigatory
stops" of persons, based on "reasonable suspicion," and authorized "frisks" to uncover any
weapons. Id. at 20-27. In so doing, the Court afforded police a powerful investigative tool,
operating outside the requirements of probable cause and warrants. See Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 207-09 (1979) (noting same). As Professor Debra Livingston recently
recognized, Terry "maybe the Court's single most important Fourth Amendment case in terms
of its role in constituting a legal environment broadly supportive of the street-level discretion
of officers on patrol." Debra Livingston, GangLoitering, The Court, and Some Realism About
Police Patrol, 1999 Sup. CT. REv. 141, 177-78. For commentary on Terry and its continued
controversy, see Symposium, Terry v. Ohio 30 Years Later: A Symposium on the Fourth
Amendment, Law Enforcement and Police-Citizen Encounters, 72 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 721
(1998).
288. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1553, 1556 (2001).
289. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (acknowledging that "even a
limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy"); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at
24-25 (observing that "[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing... constitutes a severe ...
intrusion upon cherished personal security").
290.517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). In4rkansas v. Sullivan, 121 S. Ct. 1876 (2001), the
Court reaffirmed Whren, emphasizing that subjective motivations are irrelevant both with
regard to traffic stops and full custodial arrests. On this basis, the same five Justices comprising
the majority in Atwater upheld the right of the Arkansas police to arrest Sullivan for speeding
and having an unlawfully tinted windshield, and to inventory his car. Id. at 1878.
2002]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
In tandem, Atwater and Whren allow police to act on the basis of pretext and
discriminatorymotive, adauntingprospect given the multitude ofnow arrestable low-
level offenses contained in federal, state, and local laws, and the acknowledged
willingness of government actors to utilize minor legal offenses to serve broader law
enforcement ends.29' Rather than shying away from this reality, it is, as Justice
O'Connor noted in dissent, "precisely because [police] motivations are beyond" the
Court's purview that the Court should have been on guard to "vigilantly ensure that
officers' poststop actions .. comport with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of
reasonableness."
Indeed, Atwater begs the question of whether reasonableness has been written out
of the Fourth Amendment altogether. This itself is an enormously significant
development in light of the reality that over the course of many decisions the
Rehnquist Court has staked near all on reasonableness, at the expense of the warrant
clauses of the Fourth Amendment,293 an evolution resulting in a marked diminution
of constitutional protections.2 If a seat belt violation reasonably justifies a full
custodial arrest, regardless of whether a warrant has been secured, it is hard to
imagine what would not satisfy the standard. AfterAtwater, one is constrained to ask
whether there is, in fact, a "war between the Constitution and common sense." '9
Beyond these practical realities, Atwater prompts but leaves unanswered several
major jurisprudential'issues. For one, the majority's opinion begs the question of
what role state arrest laws should, and will, play in future Fourth Amendment
analysis. Texas statutory law expressly authorized Gail Atwater's arrest; other
jurisdictions have afforded police similarly broad authority to arrest without warrants
persons suspected of committing non-breach-of-the-peace offenses.296 Several of
these samejurisdictions, however, have imposed statutory limits on warrantless arrest
authority. 7 Whether such limits will become more common as a result of the
constitutional vacuum created by Atwater, and whether they will influence Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, remain open but critically important questions.
Another area of uncertainty, ironically, stems from Atwater's bright-line rule that
291. Attorney General John Ashcroft, for instance, recently extolled the federal
government's "spit on the sidewalk" policy, underwhich "immigrants suspected ofterrorist ties
are apprehended for even minor, unrelated charges, just so long as they are taken off the
street[s]." Philip Shenon and Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Says 3 Detainees May Be Tied to
Highjackings, N.Y. TIM s, Nov. 1, 2001, at Al; see also supra note 136 and accompanying
text (discussing popularity of aggressive "broken windows" and "zero tolerance" policing
strategies).
292. Atwater, 121 S. Ct. at 1567 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
293. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (stating that the "fundamental command of the
Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable").
294. See Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman 's" Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1765-71 (1994) (surveying the
evolution toward the "quagmire of reasonableness" and attendant lessening of Fourth
Amendment protections).
295. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
296. See supra note 30.
297. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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police can arrest for "even very minor offenses," so long as probable cause exists and
the arrest is not carried out in an "extraordinary manner." ' By eschewing any
concern for offense seriousness in evaluating police decisions to arrest, the Court
seemingly eased the daily decisionmaking demands ofpolice work. 9 But in so doing
it also cast doubt upon its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that considers
proportionality in gauging the reasonableness of police behaviors. In such
circumstances, probable cause has not been deemed the sine qua non of
reasonableness, in contrast to the Court's analysis in Atwater. Furthermore, the
Court's bright-line rule, based on the idea that police should not be required to draw
factual and legal distinctions in their daily work (even regarding arrests, with their
major consequences), while on its face helpful to police, will likely only hinder their
professional development. Finally, for reasons discussed, the bright-line rule also
disserves legislatures and their constituencies, as there is now less incentive to
scrutinize criminal codes to ensure that the gravity of offenses warrants the intrusive
consequences of arrest.
In the end, however, whatever the broader and long-term consequences ofAtwater,
one thing is certain in the immediate: citizens will be well advised to buckle up, not
just for safety, but also to avoid being arrested, searched, and hauled off to jail.
298. Whether this standard will provide any appreciable protection remains to be seen.
For instance, in Texas, a federal court recently upheld the seizure of a motorist who was
stopped by police for driving 72 MPH in a 55 MPH zone. See Fritz v. City of Corrigan, 2001
WL 1078236, at *1 (E.D. Tex. 2001). The motorist signed the ticket, as requested by the
officer, and added the inscription "was not speeding" above his signature. Id. The officer then
became enraged, tore up the ticket, and told the motorist that he was to sign only his name on
the new ticket and that if he did more the officer would "take care of him." Id. Meanwhile,
during the confrontation, a private citizen who was "riding along" with the officer on patrol,
pointed a pistol at the motorist. Id. Citing Atwater in support, the court rejected the motorist's
civil rights claim because the seizure was not "extraordinary." Id. at *5.
299. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1553 (2001) (expressing desire
to avoid the situation whereby "every discretionary judgment in the field [will] be converted
into an occasion for constitutional review").
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